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I. INTRODUCTION 
Subsequently to the G20 Summit in September 2016 in Hangzhou, China the G20 published the 
G20 Guiding Principles for Global Investment Policymaking. These principles state that investment 
constituted the ‘engine of economic growth in the global economy’.1 The G20 advises governments 
to ‘avoid protectionism in relation to cross-border investment’.2 Although these principles are non-
binding and only aim to provide general guidance, they illustrate the importance of Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) on an international level. Also the 2016 A. T. Kearney Foreign Direct Investment 
Confidence Index states that the majority of the questioned executives believe that FDI will become 
increasingly important in regards to economic growth and competitiveness.3 According to the 2016 
World Investment Report by UNCTAD the global FDI inflow jumped by 38 per cent to US$ 1.76 
trillion in 2015.4 
The law of international investment emerged from growing trade activities between European 
countries during the seventeenth to the twentieth century.5 In the eighteenth and nineteenth century, 
investments were mostly made within the framework of colonialism related to the exploitation of 
natural resources, agriculture and cheap labour costs.6 During these times there was no need for a 
special legal protection of those investments as the colonies’ legal systems were imposed by the 
colonial powers and, thus, provided sufficient protection.7  
Investments in uncolonised areas were protected from adverse interventions by the exercise of 
diplomatic pressure as well as the threat of military force.8 Moreover, foreign investors sought 
superior treatment by the host states claiming that the domestic law was not applicable to their 
investments but that they remained subject to their respective home jurisdictions.9 Consequently, 
the early international investment law developed into a system of imposition of power, use of force 
and the creation of extra-territorial jurisdiction in order to obtain extended commercial benefits.10 
However, during the process of gaining independence, the colonized territories started questioning 
                                                
1 G20 Guiding Principles for Global Investment Policymaking, http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/G20-
Guiding-Principles-for-Global-Investment-Policymaking.pdf. 
2 Ibid. 
3 2016 A. T. Kearney Foreign Direct Investment Confidence Index, 
https://www.atkearney.com/documents/10192/8064626/2016+A.T.+Kearney+Foreign+Direct+Investment+Confidence
+Index–FDI+on+the+Rebound.pdf/e61ec054-3923-4f96-b46c-d4b4227e7606, 7-9. 
4 UNCTAD, World Investment Report (WIR) 2016, 2. 
5 Kate Miles ‘International Investment Law: Origins, Imperialism and Conceptualizing the Environment’ (2010) 21 
Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 1. 
6 Talkmore Chidede Legal Protection of Foreign Investment (2016) 19-20. 
7 M Sornarajah The International Law on Foreign Investment, (2004) 19. 
8 Ibid, 20. 
9 Surya P Subedi International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (2012) 7. 
10 Miles ‘International Investment Law’ op cit note 5 at 9.  
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the concept of foreign investors and businesses residing within their territory whilst not submitting 
to the domestic law.11 Subsequently, on the grounds of state sovereignty and rising economic 
nationalism, the former colonies began to assert their rights to expropriate and nationalise foreign 
assets arguing that foreign investors residing within the national territory were subject to domestic 
law.12 Thus, the need for an international system balancing the investor’s interests to minimise 
interference by the host state and the host state’s interest to maintain sovereign control and 
autonomy with minimal external influence became increasingly apparent.13  
The law of foreign investment is therefore a very old branch of international law, which underwent 
numerous changes and developments. However, the opposing interests essentially remained the 
same. Foreign investors still face a number of risks in relation to their investments abroad. Although 
direct expropriation or nationalisation became rather seldom14, the risks of indirect expropriation by 
virtue of political or legal changes are still topical.15 Whereas in the event of a direct expropriation 
foreign owned property is taken by direct means under the transfer of all, or almost all, property 
rights, an indirect expropriation occurs by the host state’s intervention in relation to the use of the 
property or the benefits thereof, even though the property rights may remain with the foreign 
investor.16 Equally, host states wish to preserve room for sovereign policy and regulations of 
investments by means of domestic legislation taking into consideration the specific socio-economic 
conditions found in the host state.17 Nowadays, these opposing interests are mainly balanced and 
regulated by customary international law, the domestic law of the host state and international 
investment agreements (IIAs), particularly Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs). BITs have become 
the prevalent international instrument to regulate investments.18 By the end of 2015 in total 2,946 
concluded BITs existed globally. 19  BITs generally provide security of investments from 
expropriation without compensation, fair and equitable treatment, national treatment, most-favoured 
nation treatment, full protection and security and legal remedies in the event of any breaches of the 
stipulations of the BIT through international arbitration, not solely between host state and home 
state, but particularly between host state and investor.20 BITs, therefore, render a high standard of 
foreign investment protection. 
                                                
11 Subedi op cit note 9 at 8. 
12 Simon Lester ‘Reforming the International Investment Law System’ (2015) 30 Maryland Journal of International 
Law (2015) 72. 
13 Sornarajah op cit note 7 at 12. 
14 Lester op cit note 12 at 74. 
15 Chidede op cit note 6 at 36-45. 
16 Subedi op cit note 9 at 74-5; Talkmore Chidede op cit note 6 at 37. 
17 Chidede op cit note 6 at 2. 
18 Andrew T. Guzman ‘Why LCDs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties’ (1997-1998) 38 Virginia Journal of International Law 640. 
19 UNCTAD WIR 2016, 101.  
20 Subedi op cit note 9 at 82. 
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Although recent trends show that investors begin to turn to developed economies21, developing 
countries still constitute a large recipient of FDI.22 FDIs into developing economies are considered 
an important instrument to integrate those economies into the international globalised economic 
community and to facilitate capital inflow.23 In 2015 the FDI flow into developing economies 
reached a new peak of US$ 765 billion.24 However, the FDI inflow to the African continent 
decreased by 7 per cent to US$ 54 billion in 2015.25 Particularly South Africa’s FDI inflow dropped 
significantly by 69 per cent to the lowest level in 10 years.26 Moreover, the 2016 OECD economy 
forecast projects an only moderate growth regarding investments in 2017 due to a lack of investor 
confidence. 27  Furthermore, South Africa dropped out of the A. T. Kearney Foreign Direct 
Investment Confidence Index in 2015 and did not manage to return to the index in 2016.28  
During the apartheid era and especially during the 1980s disinvestment movement, South Africa did 
not attract much foreign investment due to its political and economic isolation. In the post-apartheid 
era, South Africa entered into several BITs, especially with capital-exporting European countries, 
which was seen as an important diplomatic signal towards the international community announcing 
South Africa’s re-entry to the international community. 29  However, South Africa’s foreign 
investment policy has changed severely over the past five years. As a result of a review of South 
African BITs performed in 2008, South Africa decided to terminate or to not renew several BITs, 
particularly with European countries, in 2012. The main arguments were that the provisions 
imposed by the concluded BITs failed to satisfy the specific socio-economic challenges and were 
inconsistent with the Constitution.30 Furthermore, the investor-state dispute settlement provisions 
allowed mere commercial interests to influence crucial national concerns.31 In order to replace the 
terminated BITs, South Africa promulgated the Protection of Investment Act No. 22 of 2015 (the 
Investment Act) in December 2015. This new Act’s key features significantly differ from the 
provisions regularly entailed by BITs, as the Act does not differentiate between foreign and national 
                                                
21 UNCTAD WIR 2016, 4; A. T. Kearney, op cit note 3 at 1. 
22 In 2015 the FDI inflow to developing economies increased by 9 per cent compared to 2014, UNCTAD WIR 2016, 36. 
23 Chidede op cit note 6 at 1. 
24 UNCTAD WIR 2016, 36. 
25 Down to a global share of 3.1 per cent in 2015 (2014: 4.6 per cent), UNCTAD WIR 2016, 4.  
26 UNCTAD WIR 2016, 41. 
27 OECD Economic Outlook, Volume 2016, Issue 2, South Africa, http://www.oecd.org/eco/outlook/economic-forecast-
summary-south-africa-oecd-economic-outlook-november-2016.pdf. 
28 2016 A. T. Kearney op cit note 3 at 4.  
29 Azwimpheleli Langalanga, Imagining South Africa’s Foreign Investment Regulatory Regime in a Global Context, 
Occasional Paper 214, South African Institute for International Affairs, May 2015, 7. 
30 Xavier Carim, ‘International Investment Agreements and Africa’s Structural Transformation: A Perspective from 
South Africa’ in Kavalijt Singh and Burghard Ilge (Eds), Rethinking Bilateral Investment Treaties Critical Issues and 
Policy Choices, 1 ed (2016), 60. 
31 Carim op cit note 30 at 61. 
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investors.32 Moreover, the Act solely provides for state-state arbitration and only in the event that 
all domestic remedies have been exhausted first.33 The reactions by the international community 
and especially European investors were by and large negative as they feared that the new Act did 
not provide sufficient substantive protection for foreign investors, particularly in relation to indirect 
expropriation and the settlement of disputes.34 
The aim of the present dissertation is to assess and evaluate the South African Investment Act 
against the background of international investment law and Model BITs. The main focus will lie on 
the determination of gaps and inconsistencies in the Investment Act, especially regarding indirect 
expropriation and dispute resolution.  
Therefore, following an introduction, the general principles of international investment law and the 
range of protection for foreign investors offered by customary international law and by the 
standards usually provided by BITs will be outlined. 
Subsequently, the development of investment protection law in South Africa will be depicted 
against the background of the political and economic evolution from the Apartheid era to the post-
Apartheid era leading to the termination of the BITs in 2012 and the publication of the Investment 
Act. The main goal of this chapter is to provide an overview regarding the respective motivations 
and the applicable legal framework. 
In the following chapter, the Investment Act and its provisions will be assessed and evaluated. The 
objective is to determine to what extent the stipulations provided by the Act are sufficient with 
regard to the internationally recognised and acknowledged minimum standards in customary 
international law and the range of protection ordinarily provided by BITs. The goal is to determine 
whether or not the Act complies with these usually provided measurements of investor protection 
and whether the protection of foreign investments possibly decreased with particular regard to 
indirect actions and dispute resolution. 
                                                
32 Section 8 (1) of the Investment Act. 
33 Section 13 (5) of the Investment Act. 
34 Discussion Paper of the German-African Business Association (Afrika-Verein) and the EU Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry in Southern Africa, 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/55f93ec2e4b0d99faf1aef57/t/5640b423e4b031347f7a7120/1447080995959/Afrik
a-Verein_EU+Chamber_Discussion+Paper__EN+final.pdf; Comment by the European Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry in Southern Africa, http://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/this-bill-wont-protect-or-promote-investment--
eu-c. 
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II. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT PROTECTION LAW 
1. The Terms ‘Investor’ and ‘Foreign Investment’ 
The concept of foreign investment generally implies the transmission of tangible or intangible 
assets from one state into another in order to generate wealth whilst controlling the assets totally or 
partially.35 The term ‘investor’ comprises of a state, state enterprise, a foreign national or a private 
enterprise of a foreign state that has made an investment in another country.36 However, the initial 
purpose of international investment law implies the protection of private foreign investors, so that 
government-controlled entities are generally only protected in the event that their conduct can be 
qualified as commercially rather than governmentally.37 For instance, the US Model BIT of 2012 
defines an ‘investor of a party’ as 
a Party or state enterprise thereof, or a national or an enterprise of a Party, that attempts to make, is 
making, or has made an investment in the territory of the other Party; provided, however, that a 
natural person who is a dual national shall be deemed to be exclusively a national of the State of his 
or her dominant and effective nationality.38 
According to this definition not only already established investments but also ‘attempts to make’ an 
investment shall be covered by the term ‘investor’ in order to ensure protection of pre-establishment 
rights of foreign investors.39 The investor’s nationality is of particular importance as it determines 
the foreign nature of an investment. However, the origin of the investment, i.e. especially the 
question where the respective capital is coming from, is irrelevant for the purpose of defining the 
nationality.40 The determination of an individual’s or natural person’s nationality does usually not 
pose many difficulties - apart from the issue of double-nationality. The nationality is predominantly 
determined by the national law of the country whose nationality is asserted.41 A certificate of 
nationality issued by the competent authorities provides sufficient evidence in most cases.42 
However, states follow different approaches regarding the determination of a juridicial person’s 
nationality, for instance a corporation’s nationality. Different legal systems developed different 
approaches to evaluate corporate nationality.43 Civil law countries by and large follow the ‘siège 
social’, according to which the corporate nationality is determined by the location of the main seat 
                                                
35 Sornarajah op cit note 7 at 7. 
36 Subedi op cit note 9 at 58.  
37 Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer The Principles of International Investment Law 2 ed (2012) 44. 
38 Article 1 of the US Model BIT of 2012. 
39 Subedi op cit note 9 at 58.  
40 Dolzer & Schreuer op cit note 37 at 44. 
41 Christoph H. Schreuer The ICSID Convention: A Commentary 2 ed (2009) 264. 
42 Sornarajah op cit note 7 at 306; Dolzer & Schreuer op cit note 37 at 45. 
43 Sornarajah op cit note 7 at 306. 
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or central administration of a corporation.44 Common law countries rather follow the place of 
incorporation or place of registered office approach.45  
Moreover, in the absence of an universally valid legal definition of the term ‘foreign direct 
investment’, one has to turn to various definitions provided by international organisations, utilised 
in IIAs and devised by jurisprudence. 
According to UNCTAD a foreign direct investment consists in an  
’investment made by a resident of one economy in another economy, and it is of a long-term nature 
or of “lasting interest” resulting in “a significant degree of influence” on the management of the 
enterprise’.46  
In order to enhance international uniformity, a general voting share or voting power of at least 10% 
is required in order to determine a sufficient degree of interest and influence by the investor.47 
OECD defines a foreign direct investment as the  
‘objective of establishing a lasting interest by a resident enterprise in one economy (direct investor) 
in an enterprise (direct investment enterprise) that is resident in an economy other than that of the 
direct investor’. The lasting interest implies the existence of a long-term relationship between the 
direct investor and the direct investment enterprise and a significant degree of influence on the 
management of the enterprise. The direct or indirect ownership of 10% or more of the voting power 
of an enterprise resident in one economy by an investor resident in another economy is evidence of 
such a relationship.’48 
The IMF states, that 
‘direct investment is a category of cross-border investment associated with a resident in one 
economy having control or a significant degree of influence on the management of an enterprise that 
is resident in another economy.’49 
The US Model BIT of 2012 defines an ‘investment’ as  
‘every asset that an investor owns or controls, directly or indirectly, that has the characteristics of an 
investment, including such characteristics as the commitment of capital or other resources, the 
expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption of risk.’50  
                                                
44 Dolzer & Schreuer op cit note 37 at 47. 
45 Sornarajah op cit note 7 at 306. 
46 UNCTAD, Training Manual on Statistics for FDI and the Operations of TNCs, Volume 1 (2009) 35. 
47 Ibid. 
48 OECD Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment, 4 ed (2008) 48. 
49 IMF, Balance of Payment and International Investment Position Manual, 6 ed (2010) 100. 
50 Article 1 of the US Model BIT of 2012. 
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The German Model BIT of 2008 is phrased even broader. According to this, an ‘investment’ 
implies 
‘every kind of asset which is directly or indirectly invested by investors of one Contracting State in 
the territory of the other Contracting State.’51 
In the following, both Model BITs provide a non-exhaustive list of forms an investment may take. 
However, the German Model BIT, other than the US Model BIT, states that indirect investments 
shall only be covered by the Model BIT in the event that the investor realizes them via a company 
situated in the territory of the other country.52 
The ICSID Convention does not provide a definition, which has led to significant case law dealing 
with the interpretation and the scope of ‘foreign investment’. The first and most dominant53 
decision in this regard is Salini Costruttori S.P.A. v Kingdom of Morocco.54 According to the Salini 
tribunal, an investment requires (1) contributions, (2) a certain duration of performance of the 
contract, (3) participation in the risks of the transaction and (4) a contribution to the economy of the 
host state. These criteria have been applied by tribunals in several cases, although it is not 
unambiguous whether they are regarded as essential requirements constituting an investment or 
simply as factors typically indicating the existence of an investment.55  
Foreign direct investments need to be distinguished from foreign portfolio investments (FPI), which 
imply the movement of money in order to obtain shares in an enterprise founded or operating in 
another country.56 FPI involves only a minority holding (less than 10 %) in the enterprise and does 
therefore not rise to the level of the investor having direct or indirect control over the enterprise.57 
Moreover, portfolio investors tend to accept higher risks over a shorter period of time, while direct 
investments pursue long-term gains with a lower level of risks.58 
                                                
51 Article 1 (1) of the German Model BIT of 2008. 
52 Article 1 (1) of the German Model BIT of 2008. 
53 Berk Demirkol ‘The Notion of Investment in International Investment Law’ (2015) 1 The Turkish Commercial Law 
Review 46; Alex Grabowski ‘The Definition of Investment under the ICSID Convention: A Defense of Salini’ (2014) 
15 Chicago Journal of International Law 290. 
54 Salini Costruttori S.P.A. v Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, 23 July 2001, 
para 52. 
55 Schreuer op cit note 41 at 130. 
56 Sornarajah op cit note 7 at 7. 
57 Chidede op cit note 6 at 12. 
58 Ibid, 13. 
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2. Protection of Foreign Investment in International Investment Law  
a. Origins of International Investment Law 
International investment law is based on several components, yet derives particularly from 
customary law, treaties, general principles of law and dispute settlement rules.59 The origins of 
international investment law trace back to the seventeenth to early twentieth centuries, when 
European countries expanded their trade and investment and therefore occurred long before modern 
bilateral investment treaties were entrenched.60 Consequently, investment protection used to be 
largely dependent on the domestic laws governing the protection of private property, which required 
foreign investors to carefully study the respective host state’s national legislation prior to the 
establishment of an investment.61  However, international investment law seeks to determine 
international standards of alien protection through customary international law, the notion of 
diplomatic protection, international human rights law and the international law of state 
responsibility.62  
Still today there is no comprehensive multilateral agreement providing universally applicable rules 
governing the subject matter of international investments.63 Consequently, investments are not 
subjected to universally valid standards of investment promotion and protection but imply several 
rules and norms, which may differ widely.64 Although there were several attempts to establish 
multilateral investment agreements, this objective failed, largely due to the opposing positions of 
capital-exporting and capital-importing host states on the adequate standards of investor 
protection.65 The rapid expansion of international investment law was particularly driven by the 
desire of capital-exporting states to broadly protect investments made by their nationals in foreign 
by and large developing and capital-importing economic territories.66 The main focus of capital-
exporting states comprised of the establishment of a high-standard protection, which led them to 
eventually turn to bilateral investment treaties as these offered the possibility of one-on-one 
negotiations.67 After the conclusion of the first BIT in 195968, a massive spreading of BITs occurred 
                                                
59 Chidede op cit note 6 at 50. 
60 Kate Miles The Origins of International Investment Law (2013) 2. 
61 Subedi op cit note 9 at 55. 
62 Ibid, 56. 




67 Ibid.  
68 Bilateral Investment Treaty concluded between Germany and Pakistan signed 25 November 1959. 
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in the 1990s. By the end of the millennium, there were about 2000 treaties signed globally, 
especially between capital-exporting and developing states.69  
One particular feature of a foreign investment comprises of its long-term commitment vis-à-vis the 
host state, which leaves the investor incapable of leaving the country as and when it wishes. Hence, 
from the investor’s viewpoint a long-term protection is necessary, which is independent from 
changes in the domestic legislation of the host state.70 Based on its territorial sovereignty the host 
state is entitled to change its national rules applicable to foreign investment at any time in the event 
that it considers the current stipulations not appropriate. Accordingly, as international investors 
were unable to faithfully rely on the host state’s legislation, they sought investment protection by 
other means than national law. Guzman names this ‘dynamic inconsistency problem’ which 
describes the situation that the adherence to a certain conduct agreed upon can only be ensured via 
the establishment of a binding mechanism ensuring the continued commitment of both parties to the 
initial agreement despite potential changes in interests and objectives of each party, particularly on 
part of the host.71 This special protection mechanism has recently been sought particularly under 
BITs as neither party to the agreement is capable of unilaterally changing the stipulations set out in 
the agreement.72 Another particular feature of BITs is the fact that they are often agreed between a 
capital-exporting developed state and a less developed host state seeking to attract foreign capital 
inflow - thus, the capital flow usually only occurs one-way. However, the formulation of BITs 
ordinarily provides for a reciprocal capital flow, which is not consistent with the actual 
circumstances.73 The developing country promises to protect the foreign investments made in its 
territory in exchange for the receipt of foreign capital inflow to its economy.74 Due to the fact that 
the states parties to BITs are usually of different bargaining power the relationship hence qualifies 
as unequal.75 In order to obtain the prospect of future investment inflows developing countries agree 
to a limitation of their regulation rights as those regulations potentially constitute a breach of the 
stipulations provided by the investment treaty.76 Moreover, treaties do generally not contain a firm 
obligation of the capital-exporting vis-à-vis the capital-receiving state to actually effect investments, 
hence the host-states commit to surrender parts of their sovereignty rights merely based on the hope 
to receive capital inflow but in the absence of any assurance thereof.77 Therefore, the underlying 
                                                
69 Sornarajah op cit note 7 at 204; Miles The Origins of International Investment Law op cit note 60 at 86. 
70 Subedi op cit note 9 at 81. 
71 Guzman op cit note 18 at 658-9. 
72 Subedi op cit note 9 at 82. 
73 Sornarajah op cit note 7 at 207. 
74 Alec R. Johnson ‘Rethinking Bilateral Investment Treaties in Sub-Saharan Africa’ (2010) 59 Emory Law Journal 
924. 
75Sornarajah op cit note 7 at 207. 
76 Johnson op cit note 74 at 924. 
77 Ibid.  
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idea of international investment law is to balance the opposing interests of foreign investors and 
host states and the prevention of economic distortion by discrimination of aliens.78 
b. Customary International Minimum Standard  
The international mininum standard of treatment of foreign nationals constitutes the main principle 
in international investment law regarding investment protection.79 The minimum standard emerged 
from the law on the diplomatic protection of aliens.80 A breach of the diplomatic protection of 
aliens could trigger an intervention right of the home state entitling it to take actions on behalf of its 
aggrieved national.81 However, the minimum standard was initially only concerned with the 
protection of the physical person of the alien while abroad; it was only in the second half of the 
twentieth century that tribunals began to extend the scope of protection to foreign investments under 
the assertion of having a creative function to perform.82 The international law regarding the 
protection of alien property, however, was initially based on the idea that the alien submitted to the 
application of the local laws and jurisdiction by its decision to enter and carry on business in the 
host state’s territory.83 Nowadays the existence of an international minimum standard regarding the 
treatment of foreign investors is principally acknowledged; however, its scope and limits are rather 
unclear. 84  Three notions, which can be drawn from early case law on the matter of state 
responsibility, appear to shape the minimum standard: first, the requirement of a compensation for 
expropriation, secondly, the responsibility for destruction or violence by non-state actors and lastly, 
denial of justice.85 In the course of establishing investment protection by BITs, the initial scope of 
the minimum standard was broadened. BITs commonly provide explicit protection regarding the 
first and second aspect. The first aspect displays the common main concern of investment treaties 
whereas the second aspect is usually taken into account in the shape of the requirement of ‘full 
protection and security’. 86  Consequently, only denial of justice remains of independent 
significance.87 In Azinian v Mexico the ICSID tribunal held that ‘[a] denial of justice could be 
pleaded if the relevant courts refuse to entertain a suit, if they subject it to undue delay, or if they 
administer justice in a seriously inadequate way.’88 However, arbitral awards are only very 
                                                
78 Subedi op cit note 9 at 57. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Miles The Origins of International Investment Law op cit note 60 at 47. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Sornarajah op cit note 7 at 329.  
83 Miles The Origins of International Investment Law op cit note 60 at 48. 
84 Sornarajah op cit note 7 at 329. 
85 Ibid, 330. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Azinian, Davitian & Baca v United Mexican States Award ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/2, para 102. 
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seldomly based on the notion of denial of justice as tribunals refrain from stating misconduct by 
judicial organs of courts.89 
c. Expropriation 
It is a fundamental and broadly accepted principle in international law that host states have the right 
to expropriate foreign assets as part of their territorial and economic sovereignty.90 Therefore, most 
modern investment treaties respect the notion of state sovereignty and only engage with the 
conditions and consequences of an expropriation, however, leaving the principal right to 
expropriation untouched.91 The expropriation of assets generally involves the transfer of property 
rights.92 
i. The Legality of an Expropriation 
Nowadays it is widely understood in international law that an expropriation can constitute a legally 
admissible action in the event that certain requirements are met. First, the measure of expropriation 
must serve a public purpose. Secondly, an expropriation must not be performed in an arbitrary or 
discriminatory fashion.93  Moreover, the measure must be conducted in compliance with the 
applicable law and due process. Lastly, the expropriation must provide for compensation.94 Put 
differently, any expropriation, which does not meet the requirements of serving a public purpose, 
non-discrimination, due process and compensation is illegal under international investment 
protection law.95 
ii. Direct and Indirect Expropriation 
Broadly, the subject matter of expropriation falls into two classifications: First, direct and 
expropriations and secondly, indirect expropriation. 
Direct expropriation implies the actual taking of alien assets by the host government via direct 
means under deprivation of the legal title of the foreign investor’s property.96 Accordingly, a direct 
expropriation implies the loss of all, or almost all, meaningful control in relation to the foreign 
asset.97 However, today direct expropriations occur rather seldom as states restrain from the overt 
taking from alien property rights as such a conduct is highly likely to attract negative publicity and 
                                                
89 Sornarajah op cit note 7 at 330. 
90 Chidede op cit note 6 at 37. 
91 Dolzer & Schreuer op cit note 37 at 98. 
92 Chidede op cit note 6 at 37. 
93 Subedi op cit note 9 at 73. 
94 Dolzer & Schreuer op cit note 37 at 99. 
95 Chidede op cit note 6 at 70. 
96 Peter D. Isakoff ‘Defining the Scope of Indirect Expropriations for International Investments’ (2013) 3 Global 
Business Law Review 192; Dolzer & Schreuer op cit note 37 at 101. 
97 Subedi op cit note 9 at 74. 
 
  12 
to cause potential damage to the states’ reputation regarding international investments.98 Hence, 
nowadays the main concern comprises of indirect takings. An indirect taking implies a legal or 
administrative governmental action, which does not affect the foreign investor’s legal title as such 
but leads to a deprivation of the property’s substantial benefits or of the feasible usage of the 
respective asset.99 The determination of an indirect expropriation entails more difficulties due to the 
fact that the opposing interests of the investor and the host state’s sovereignty rights need to be 
balanced.100 Furthermore, indirect expropriation may manifest in various forms. In the event that the 
host state’s government takes a series of actions, which lead to a reduction of the investment’s 
economic value, this conduct may constitute ‘creeping expropriation’.101 The cumulative impact of 
several measures by the host state could rise to the level of expropriation, even though the 
respective single action on its own was insufficient to constitute the allegation of expropriation.102 
The ICSID tribunal in Generation Ukraine v Ukraine defined ‘creeping expropriation’ as  
‘a form of indirect expropriation with a distinctive temporal quality in the sense that it encapsulates 
the situation whereby a series of acts attributable to the State over a period of time culminate in the 
expropriatory taking of such property.’103 
Another form indirect expropriation may take is ‘regulatory expropriation’, which may occur when 
the host state takes regulatory measures affecting the economic value of the foreign owned asset.104 
It will be decisive if the governmental action in question amounts to expropriation requiring 
compensation or if it merely displays the legitimate exert of the host state’s regulatory discretion 
governing public welfare objectives.105 The Link Trading v Republic of Moldova tribunal held that 
regulatory measures  
‘only become expropriatory when they are found to be an abusive taking. Abuse arises where it is 
demonstrated that the Slate has acted unfairly or inequitably towards the investment, where it has 
adopted measures that are arbitrary or discriminatory in character or in their manner of 
implementation, or where the measures taken violate an obligation undertaken by the State in regard 
to the investment.’106 
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d. Fair and Equitable Treatment 
BITs commonly provide for a ‘fair and equitable treatment’ (FET), which has to be granted to the 
parties to the treaty.107 The notion of FET has given rise to various case law as the vast majority of 
successful cases were based on the alleged violation of this standard.108 This development occurred 
due to its broadness and vagueness109, which, however, allows it to cover a wider range of 
potentially breaching measures.110 The initial purpose of the FET was to achieve an objective which 
would be capable of filling potential gaps regarding the protection of foreign investments as not all 
administrative or legislative measures by the host state might be subsumable under one of the other 
protection measurements provided for in BITs.111 Moreover, the FET is a ‘non-contingent’ standard 
and therefore provides for an absolute protection, which implies that the extent of protection is 
independent from the range of protection afforded to others.112 Accordingly, host governments are 
unable to object to a claim solely based on the argument that the respective investor was treated in 
the same way as nationals or other foreign investors.113 Most BITs stipulate that the contracting 
parties have to accord fair and equitable treatment to the covered investments of the respective other 
party without any explicit definition of the standard as such.114 Due to the broadness and vagueness 
of the FET standard, several tribunals attempted to define and specify the meaning.115 In 2012, the 
Swisslion v Macedonia tribunal expressed its view that the ‘[FET] standard basically ensures that 
the foreign investor is not unjustly treated, with due regard to all surrounding circumstances, and 
that it is a means to guarantee justice to foreign investors.’116 In Genin v Estonia the tribunal 
defined a violation as ‘acts showing a wilful neglect of duty, an insufficiency of action falling far 
below international standards, or even subjective bad faith.’117 The Saluka v Czech Republic 
tribunal stated that the FET standard involves certain requirements, which have to be adhered to by 
the host government: 
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A foreign investor whose interests are protected under the Treaty is entitled to expect that the [host 
state] will not act in a way that is manifestly inconsistent, non-transparent, unreasonable (i.e. 
unrelated to some national policy, or discriminatory (i.e. based on unjustifiable distinctions).118 
Therefore, the FET standard in BITs provides that investments or investors are granted a treatment, 
which is reasonable, consistent, non-discriminatory, transparent and in accordance with due 
process.119 The subject matter, which will be examined in order to determine the adherence to the 
FET standard is the treatment of the alien investor by the host state regardless of the importance of 
the measure or the respective economic sector to the host.120 However, the foreign investor’s 
legitimate expectations regarding its investment developed to be a crucial aspect based on the 
growing reference hereto by arbitral tribunals.121 As this notion is not mentioned in actual FET 
provisions it constitutes an arbitral innovation.122 In this regard, the Tecmed tribunal - one of the 
most cited cases123 - stated the following: 
‘The Arbitral Tribunal considers that this provision of the Agreement, in light of the good faith 
principle established by international law, requires the Contracting Parties to provide to international 
investments treatment that does not affect the basic expectations that were taken into account by the 
foreign investor to make the investment. The foreign investor expects the host State to act in a 
consistent manner, free from ambiguity and totally transparently in its relations with the foreign 
investor, so that it may know beforehand any and all rules and regulations that will govern its 
investments, as well as the goals of the relevant policies and administrative practices or directives, to 
be able to plan its investment and comply with such regulations. […] The foreign investor also 
expects the host State to act consistently, i.e. without arbitrarily revoking any preexisting decisions 
or permits issued by the State that were relied upon by the investor to assume its commitments as 
well as to plan and launch its commercial and business activities. The investor also expects the State 
[…] not to deprive the investor of its investment without the required compensation. In fact, failure 
by the host State to comply with such pattern of conduct with respect to the foreign investor or its 
investments affects the investor’s ability to measure the treatment and protection awarded by the 
host State and to determine whether the actions of the host State conform to the fair and equitable 
treatment principle.’124 
The legal framework at the time of the investment is decisive in order to determine the legitimate 
expectations of a foreign investor as this offers the investor the possibility to examine the legal 
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status in the host country while the host government is able to determine the legal stipulations 
which formed the basis for the investor’s expectations.125 Therefore, the investor is unable to call 
for changes in the domestic legislation but is entitled to a faithful application of the existing 
legislation as it is part of the host state’s sovereignty rights to establish the legal framework 
applicable to foreign investments.126  
e. Full Protection and Security 
The entitlement to ‘full protection and security’ (FPS) is another crucial non-contingent standard 
usually provided for by BITs.127 This standard generally implies that contracting parties shall grant 
FPS to investments and investors by the respective other contacting party within their respective 
territory128 and derives from the international minimum standard, which required the state to take 
responsibility for destruction or violence of non-state actors.129 However, there is a general consent 
that the standard of FPS does not offer absolute protection in relation to physical or legal 
infringements but that the host state is obliged to take such measures, which are necessary and 
reasonable in order to protect the foreign investment under the given circumstances. 130 
Consequently, the host state is essentially required to exert ‘due diligence’ regarding the protection 
of alien property.131 Moreover, the state cannot excuse itself based on the notion that reasonable 
measures could not be taken due to a lack of capacity or resources.132 However, a violation of the 
standard cannot be constituted by reasonable regulation and legislation appropriate under the given 
circumstances.133 In general, the standard of FPS is not designed to apply to a state’s decision-
making process but is deemed to govern the protection from civil strife and physical violence 
performed by state officials or others by the exercise of police power.134 The standard, therefore, 
intends to render protection against the violation of the investor’s property or interests by state 
forces or others, which could be reasonably anticipated and prevented.135  
f. National Treatment  
The national treatment (NT) standard stipulates that host states have to accord an extent of 
investment protection to foreign investors, which is at least as favourable as the extent of 
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investment protection rendered to domestic investors in like circumstances.136 The objective of the 
NT standard is to rule out discrimination based on the investor’s nationality by means of a 
comparison with the treatment awarded to foreign and national investors under the provision of 
similar circumstances.137 The main objective of the standard, as stated by UNCTAD, is to ‘ensure a 
degree of competitive equality between national and foreign investors’.138 Moreover, the standard 
‘raises difficult questions concerning the factual situations in which national treatment applies and 
the precise standard of comparison by which the treatment of national and foreign investors is to be 
compared’.139 Moreover, it is questionable which factors determine ‘like circumstances’. In Pope & 
Talbot Inc v Canada the tribunal held that - as a first step - the treatment of a foreign investment 
‘should be compared with that [treatment] accorded domestic investments in the same business or 
economic sector.’140 Additionally, the tribunal held that different treatment of foreign and domestic 
investors will violate the NT standard ‘unless they have a reasonable nexus to rational government 
policies that (1) do not distinguish, on their face or de facto, between foreign-owned and domestic 
companies, and (2) do not otherwise unduly undermine the investment liberalizing objectives of 
[the investment agreement]’.141 This definition provides for some leeway for states as they may 
differentiate between foreign and domestic investments for national policy reasons but only to the 
extent that the policy measure itself is not discriminatory. Due to inequalities in economic power, 
technical capabilities and financial strength, different treatment of foreign and domestic investors 
may be reasonably necessary under certain circumstances for the purpose of creating a certain 
amount of operative equality.142 Hence, treaties or related instruments often entail exceptions 
determining in which areas the NT standard is deemed to be not applicable.143 However, it has to be 
stressed that mere economic reasons are not sufficient, as they do not constitute a rational 
government policy.144 Thus, the obligation of NT is not unlimited and absolute but it ensures that 
host states do not attempt to achieve national law or policy goals by means of discriminating foreign 
investors, unless there is a reasonable exception.145 Hence, UNCTAD stated that the determination 
of the scope of the standard is ‘dependent on the treatment offered by a host country to domestic 
investors and not on some a priori absolute principles of treatment’.146 However, the extent of 
differential treatment should be kept at the lowest possible level and not be greater than absolutely 
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necessary.147 Moreover, the majority of BITs stipulate that the NT standard is only applicable to 
already established investments, however, some BITs also provide for application in the pre-
establishment phase.148  
g. Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment  
Another standard commonly used in BITs is the most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment. The 
objective of the standard of MFN is to ensure equal treatment and conditions between foreign 
investors from third countries.149 Foreign investors aim to achieve a level of investment protection, 
which creates a ‘level playing ground’ in order to prevent economic disadvantages and 
discrimination, also, or particularly, in relation to foreign investors from other third countries.150 
Hence, the MFN treatment contributes to the establishment of competitive equality by eliminating 
the distortion of competition based on nationality considerations.151 The Draft Articles on MFN 
Clauses provided by the ILC define the MFN treatment clause as ‘a treaty provision whereby a 
State undertakes an obligation towards another State to accord most-favoured-nation treatment in an 
agreed sphere of relations’.152 Hence, the MFN treatment standard is not an absolute but a relative 
standard in that its scope and extent hinges on the particular state’s conduct.153 Thus, the MFN 
clause may not take any effect in the event that the state in question does not accord any relevant 
benefit to third states.154 Moreover, the standard generally applies to all kind of activities related to 
an investment, such as the ‘establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, 
sale or other disposition’.155 However, parties may agree on exceptions regarding MFN, which 
permit differential treatment for foreign investors, e.g. based on attempts of regional integration, 
such as custom unions and free trade areas.156 In Maffezini v Spain, the ICSID tribunal held that the 
relatively broad definition of MFN in the Spain – Argentina BIT would not only entail substantive 
but also procedural rights, i.e. dispute settlement provisions permitting the submission of the 
dispute to international arbitration.157 However, in Plama Consortium v Bulgaria, the ICSID 
tribunal rejected the view of the Maffezini tribunal based on the notions that firstly, the possibility to 
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submit disputes to international arbitration needs to be expressly agreed between the parties and 
secondly, the general application of MFN to dispute settlement provisions would lead to a ‘chaotic 
situation’.158 The decision in Plama Consortium is considered as preferable over the Maffezini 
reasoning, therefore, the MFN treatment is only deemed applicable to the subject matter of dispute 
resolution in the event that the parties expressly provided for its application.159 Moreover, most 
BITs only provide for the application of the MFN treatment in the post-establishment phase, 
however there are some exceptional BITs, which determine application in the pre-establishment 
phase.160 
h. Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
Another provision commonly found in BITs relates to the dispute settlement. BITs commonly entail 
two different types of dispute settlement: First, clauses providing arbitration between the host state 
and the investor, and secondly, clauses providing arbitration between the state parties to the 
treaty.161 Traditional international stipulated that states could only be sued by other states, as 
individuals were not granted legal standing.162 Hence, home states were obliged to litigate on their 
aggrieved national’s behalf in order to accord them diplomatic protection whereby it was uncertain 
if the investor would be awarded compensation.163 However, nowadays BITs generally entail 
clauses providing accessibility of international arbitration tribunals, such as ICSID, for the investor 
in the event of disputes vis-à-vis the host state.164 Accordingly, modern BITs allow home states to 
exempt themselves from the obligation to take actions on behalf of its nationals while maintaining 
and promoting the effectiveness of remedies for the investor, who is no longer forced to rely on 
diplomatic protection.165 From the investor’s perspective this is particularly favourable against the 
background of potential uncertainty with regards to the national courts’ impartiality and 
independence. 166  The accessibility of international arbitration provides the investor with the 
prospect of a fair and impartial decision by an international legal forum extricated from political or 
economic motivations.167  
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i. Compensation for Expropriation 
The concept of compensation for expropriation is one of the main principles of international 
investment law. In the event that a state expropriates foreign assets within the scope of its 
sovereignty rights, it shall traditionally be liable to pay compensation to the foreign owner.168 The 
vast majority of BITs provides for a ‘full’ compensation, whereby the term ‘full’ is defined as 
‘prompt, adequate and effective’.169 This term of ‘prompt, adequate and effective’ became known as 
the ‘Hull Rule’ or ‘Hull Formula’ as it derives from a statement made by the American Secretary of 
State, Cordell Hull.170 The aspect of a ‘prompt’ compensation comprises that the respective investor 
should not have to wait for a longer time, i.e. possibly several years.171 Compensation is ‘adequate’ 
when it reflects the appropriate value of the ceased property and displays the value of the invested 
assets and the expected profits.172 Moreover, compensation is ‘effective’ when it is provided in a 
form, which is beneficiary for the former owner, thus paid in a convertible or transferable 
currency.173 Although the vast majority of BITs adopted the Hull Rule, it does not constitute 
customary international law.174 Capital-exporting states support the Hull Rule as the rapid payment 
of the full value of the property prevents the investor from suffering material damages and allows 
him to swiftly reinvest the capital, whereas in particular developing states largely criticise the Hull 
Rule and plead for a less stringent approach.175 In 1974 the United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources provided a limiting approach in 
regards to compensation by stipulating that an ‘appropriate’ compensation needs to be paid.176 The 
standard of ‘appropriate’ compensation is deemed to be more subjective than the concept of 
‘adequate and effective’ compensation.177 Regardless of which terms are used in the respective 
treaty, BITs commonly provide determination of compensation based on the ‘fair market value’ or 
‘genuine value’ of the concerned asset.178 This conduct is broadly acknowledged as it takes into 
account the value of the asset at the moment of the taking.179 
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j. Transfer of Funds  
Another provision ordinarily found in BITs relates to the subject matter of transfer of funds, which 
constitutes the host country’s undertaking to allow for the payment, conversion and repatriation of 
funds in connection with the foreign investment.180 Most BITs provide for an absolute rather than a 
relative obligation, as the ability of repatriating profits to the home state is a main objective of 
foreign investments.181 In contrast, multilateral agreements often provide for exceptions, which 
exempt the host state from the general obligation on the basis of the state’s economic 
circumstances.182 The inclusion of such derogations seems reasonable in the event that one 
contracting party experiences an economic crisis which causes the other contracting party losses, for 
instance due to exchange shortfalls.183 During a financial or economic crisis, large surges of capital 
outflows might exacerbate the host state’s situation and make it even more difficult for the country 
to implement appropriate adjustment policies.  
III. DEVELOPMENT OF INVESTMENT LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA 
1. Apartheid Era 
The Apartheid system was formally institutionalised in South Africa in 1948 by the National Party  
(NP) and constituted the establishment of two distinct economies and societies within the territory 
of South Africa. 184  The establishment of the Apartheid system particularly included the 
implementation of expanding legislative framework stipulating racial segregation, for instance the 
Group Areas Act of 1950 - which divided the country in separate geographical areas, the Republic 
of South Africa and the so-called homelands - and the Separate Amenities Act of 1953 - which 
provided racial segregation with regards to public facilities and accommodations.185 During these 
times the South African political and economical agenda comprised of an inward perspective 
manifested in the substitution of imports with locally manufactured products and ‘capital 
control’.186 However, during the 1950s, the resistance by the black community against the racial 
discrimination massively increased resulting in greater scrutiny by the international community.187 
In the 1960s the international business community began to exert a ‘disinvestment movement’ in 
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order to protest against the Apartheid system and to effect social change in South Africa by 
imposing trade sanctions and investment boycotts.188 Subsequently, foreign state governments189 
started to pass legislation restricting investments in South Africa - for instance most prominently 
the federal Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 by the US, which banned US nationals from 
new investments and trade in South Africa.190 African institutions, namely the Organization of 
African Unity, also joined the disinvestment movement and greatly discouraged trade relations with 
South Africa.191 As a result, an estimated total of 350 trans-national companies decided to withdraw 
from business activities in South Africa, which resulted in an immense capital outflow of South 
Africa. 192  Moreover, South African businesses and industries were impeded to grow into 
internationally operating businesses as foreign firms were restraining from associating with South 
African companies due to the severe international pressure.193 Hence, South Africa was facing an 
economic stagnation and political instability due to increasingly violent resistance by the end of the 
1980s.194 Eventually, the massive external pressure and the constantly increasing internal expenses 
resulting from the high maintaining costs of the implemented security system forced the 
government to rethink the concept of Apartheid.195 On 2 February 1990 the South African President 
Frederik W. de Klerk officially announced the release of African National Congress (ANC) leader 
Nelson Mandela from prison and the lifting of bans of the ANC and other legal political groups.196 
Nelson Mandela was released from prison on 11 February 1990.197 In the following, a series of 
tedious and difficult negotiations took place between the ANC, the then governing NP and 
representatives of organised business and labour associations with the purpose of working 
peacefully towards a legitimate and democratic multiracial government.198 
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2. Developments in Post-Apartheid Era  
a. Pre-Constitutional Era 
In the course of enduring negotiations, the main legislative pillars of Apartheid, such as the Group 
Areas Act of 1953 and the Population Registration Act of 1950199 were abolished, which paved the 
way for formal negotiations regarding a future Constitution by the end of 1991.200 Subsequently, 
most international trade sanctions and investment boycotts were lifted: The US repealed remaining 
sanctions under the Comprehensive Antiapartheid Act in July 1992; the then European Community 
(EC) revoked most bans in 1992; the United Nations (UN) lifted respective sanctions in 1993.201 
Eventually the first multiracial democratic elections were held in April 1994 with a tremendous 
success for the ANC, which won the elections with a share of 62.6% of the votes.202 The election of 
a new democratic government, under the guidance of State President Nelson Mandela, constituted a 
shift towards more open-looking and trade and investment orientated economic and social 
policies.203 The results and achievements of this negotiation period are enshrined in the South 
African Constitution Act No. 108 of 1996 (the Constitution), which came into force in 1996.204 
Regarding the legal investment framework, two considerations, which evolved during the 
negotiation phase, are of particular relevance. Firstly, the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) 
policy was formed and later codified in the Constitution.205 Second, the negotiations constituted the 
beginning of a series of conclusion of BITs with developed countries with the purpose of generating 
capital inflow and mitigating poverty and unemployment.206 
b. Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act and the Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act 
The Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) policy evolved against the backdrop of the massive and 
enduring racial discrimination and the exclusion from economic opportunities and business 
ownership particularly suffered by the black population during the Apartheid era.207 The BEE 
strategy is founded on section 9 (2) of the South African Constitution, which states that in order 
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‘[t]o promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or 
advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.’208 
The term ‘black’ is used generically and entails Africans, Coloureds and Indians.209 The aim of the 
BEE policy is to enable the promotion and facilitation of black people in regard to the participation 
in the country’s economy by raising the share of black employment, management and control of 
businesses.210 In 2003 the Broad-Based Black Empowerment Act No. 53 of 2003 (the B-BBEE Act) 
was enacted based on subsection 9 (2) of the Constitution with the objective of enhancing the 
hitherto insufficient achievements of the BEE policy.211 Section 1 of the B-BBEE Act defines BEE 
as 
‘the economic empowerment of all black people […] through diverse but integrated socio-economic 
strategies that include, but are not limited to  
(a) increasing the number of black people that manage, own and control and enterprises assets;  
(b) facilitating ownership and management of enterprises and productive assets by communities, 
workers, cooperatives and other collective enterprises 
[…] 
(f) investment in enterprises that are owned or managed by black people; […]’. 
As part of the BBE-strategy, the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act No. 28 of 
2002 (MPRDA) was promulgated. The objectives thereof are according to section 2, inter alia, the 
augmentation of opportunities for historically disadvantaged persons212, the enhancement of their 
benefits from the exploitation of South Africa’s mineral and petroleum resources and the 
safeguarding of the sustainable development in relation thereto.213 In order to achieve this goal the 
MPRDA creates a new mineral regulation framework, which varies widely from the previous 
mineral rights system.214 The previous system was determined by South African common law, 
according to which the landowner is entitled to the whole of the land including the space above the 
surface and everything below it.215 Thus, the landowner was also owner of the respective minerals 
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and petroleum resources found on his land - though the mineral and petroleum rights were separable 
from the landownership and transferable.216 However, the holder of the mineral rights had to obtain 
permissions by the government in order to undertake prospecting activities or conduct mining 
subject to the Minerals Act No. 50 of 1991.217 These authorisations constituted regulatory licences 
premised on the underlying rights, which in themselves did however not confer any rights.218 The 
introduction of the MPRDA annulled the 1991 Minerals Act and eliminated all old order mineral 
rights.219 After the MPRDA came into effect in 2004, old order mineral rights were obliterated and 
ceased by the state, who became the ‘custodian’ thereof on behalf of all the people of South 
Africa.220 Thus, private companies with previous mineral rights holdings were obliged to apply for 
new licences, which however do not provide the applicant with full rights but only with a ‘limited 
real right in respect of the mineral or petroleum and the land to which such rights relate’.221 
Moreover, the applicant is obliged to demonstrate the manner in which the granting of the requested 
rights would contribute to the expansion of opportunities for historically disadvantaged persons and 
the promotion of socio-economic welfare.222 Particularly, applicants were obliged to undertake to 
divest 26% of their ownership stake within a period of ten years223 to historically disadvantaged 
persons as stipulated by the Mining Charter.224 However, the MPRDA provides for a conversion 
process, which allows for the transformation of old order (lost) rights into new order mining and 
prospecting rights under the MRDPA subject to approval by the Minister of Minerals and 
Energy.225 
In Piero Foresti et al. v Republic of South Africa226, the claimants - a group of Italian nationals and 
a company based in Luxembourg - brought claims challenging the MPRDA based on the assertion 
that the extinction of previously held mineral rights as stipulated by the MPRDA and the 
requirement of mandatory divestment in favour of historically disadvantaged persons were in 
breach with the expropriation stipulations of the BIT concluded between South Africa and Italy and 
between South Africa and Belgium and Luxembourg.227 Therefore, according to the claimants, the 
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putting and coming into effect of the MPRDA constituted an expropriation of the previous mineral 
rights and the respective shares in the operating companies, and a violation of the FET and the NT 
standard entailed by the respective BITs.228 
South Africa however claimed that the investments in question had not been expropriated, neither 
directly nor indirectly, and even if they were, the expropriation occurred in compliance with the 
expropriation stipulations provided by the respective BITs and was lawful as it was conducted for a 
public purpose, under the provision of immediate or prompt compensation that is full or adequate 
and effective, on a non-discriminatory basis and under due process of law.229 As to the aspect of the 
public purpose of the alleged expropriations, South Africa argued that the promulgation of the 
MPRDA served the purpose of 
(i) ‘simplifying and modernizing an overly complex legal system;  
(ii) ameliorating the disenfranchisement of HDSAs and other negative social effects caused by apartheid 
in general and the 1991 Mineral Rights Act in particular;  
(iii) reducing the economically harmful concentration of mineral rights and promoting the optimal 
exploitation of mineral resources; and  
(iv)  protecting the environment and the communities living in the vicinity of mining operations’.230 
Even though the dispute was settled on the merits, it received enormous international attention.231 
Another important decision challenging the MPRDA is the judgment by the South African 
Constitutional Court in the case Agri SA v The Minister for Mineral and Energy.232 This judgement 
is particularly important as it depicts the interpretation of the right to property and the meaning of 
expropriation under section 25 of the South African Constitution. Agri SA instituted proceedings on 
behalf of a company, which had held old order rights but did not manage to apply for the 
conversion thereof due to liquidation of the company.233 The Constitutional Court held that 
although the extinction of the previous mineral rights constituted a deprivation thereof, the 
deprivation was not arbitrary.234 The court further held that the deprivation did not amount to 
expropriation, as the establishment of an expropriation compulsorily required the acquisition of the 
property rights in question by the state.235 As the state only became ‘custodian’ of the mineral rights 
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by virtue of the MPRDA, the state had not acquired ownership of the mineral rights.236 The court 
held that section 25 of the Constitution interdicted an ‘over-emphasis [is] [on] private property 
rights at the expense of the state’s social responsibilities.’237 These findings represent the majority 
decision, three of the judges however declared that they considered the rule that expropriation 
required the compulsory acquisition of rights in property by the state as too inflexible.238 
c. Entry into and Termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties 
Following the democratic transformation, the South African government sought to attract FDI in 
order to mitigate the high employment and poverty rates and to increase capital flow into the 
country.239 Nelson Mandela stressed the importance of FDI for the South African economy in an 
article published in 1993 dealing with the future foreign policies of South Africa: 
‘It is obvious to me that the primary components of our international economic relations, which 
must feed our development strategy, are the strengthening of our trade performance and our 
capacity to attract foreign investment. […] We do not expect foreign investment to solve our 
economic problems, but we understand that it can play a very valuable role in our economic 
development. […]  
The ANC believes the most important way to attract foreign investment is to create a stable and 
democratic political environment. Also important is the development of legitimate, transparent and 
consistent economic policies. […] And while we do not plan to provide exclusive incentives for all 
foreign investors, we realize that it might be necessary to make special arrangements to attract the 
kind of investment that will make a real difference in South Africa.’240 
Immediately following the election of Nelson Mandela as president, the new democratic 
government decided to conclude numerous BITs in order to send a diplomatic signal to the 
international community that South Africa desired to re-engage with foreign countries and that 
foreign investments would be protected and secured by means of international investment law.241 
Between 1994 and 1998, South Africa entered into around fifteen BITs, mostly with South Africa’s 
main traditional trading partners, i.e. capital-exporting Western European states.242 These BITs 
were largely formulated following the OECD template regarding the format and objectives.243 In 
this respect, however, it is important to stress that the Republic of South Africa had neither previous 
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history nor expertise regarding the conclusion of BITs due to the historical background. Thus, the 
newly elected government, which aimed to demonstrate South Africa’s new investment friendly 
climate, was not fully apprised of the risks and consequences, which may result from the conclusion 
of BITs.244  
A turning point of South Africa’s approach to and perception of BITs occurred following the above-
mentioned case Piero Foresti v Republic of South Africa.245 Even though the dispute was settled on 
the merits246, it induced the South Africa government, namely the Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI), to undertake a comprehensive review and risk assessment of the existing BITs beginning in 
2007.247 In June 2009, the DTI published the ‘Bilateral Investment Treaty Policy Framework 
Review Government Position Paper’, which reflects the respective findings. One of the main 
findings was that there was no proven correlation between the conclusion of BITs and the actual 
flow of FDI into the South African economy.248 South Africa received substantial FDI from 
countries with whom the country has not signed any investment agreements whereas the FDI inflow 
from many partner countries was much less significant or even non-existent.249 Furthermore, South 
Africa’s current BITs were too far-reaching and limited policy space in a manner, which led to the 
prevention of the country’s sustainable development.250 Moreover, the state-investor-arbitration 
provisions contained in BITs allowed for the assessment of vital national interests against the 
backdrop of mere commercial interests which might lead to unpredictable arbitration decisions 
contradictory to legitimate and constitutional policies.251  
Thus, in July 2010 the South African Cabinet decided to undertake measures in order to modernise 
and enhance the investment protection framework.252 In this respect, the Cabinet emphasised five 
core elements253:  
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1) Development of a new Investment Act which codifies and clarifies provisions typically entailed by 
BITs into domestic law with focus on the enhancement of existing investor protection; 
2) Termination of the first generation BITs, however under proposition of renegotiation; 
3) Prevention of conclusion of future BITs, unless compelling economic and political reasons exist to 
do so; 
4) Development of a new Model BIT for the purpose of negotiations or renegotiations of BITs; 
5) Establishment of an Inter-Ministerial Committee comprised of representatives of various 
government departments to monitor the process. 
As a result, the South African government decided to terminate numerous BITs particularly with 
European states254 and began to rearrange the domestic investment protection framework focussing 
on the inclusion of policy space in relation to socio-economic needs.255 In the following the 
government published the draft Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill (PPIB)256 in November 
2013, encouraging public comments relating thereto.257 In July 2015 a first revised version was 
released, and in November 2015 a further revised version was passed by both Houses of 
Parliament.258 South African President, Jacob G. Zuma gave his assent to the Investment Bill on 13 
December 2015, which led to its publication in the Government Gazette on 15 December 2015, now 
named the Protection of Investment Act No. 22 of 2015.259 
IV. LEGAL PROTECTION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT UNDER THE 2015 
PROTECTION OF INVESTMENT ACT NO. 22 OF 2015 
The Protection of Investment Act of No. 22 of 2015 (the Investment Act) was promulgated in the 
Government Gazette on 15 December 2015. The date of commencement of the Investment Act is 
however still to be proclaimed, which means that it has not come into operation yet. 
According to section 4 of the Investment Act, the main objective is to protect investments aligned 
with the South African Constitution whilst balancing public interest and rights and obligations of 
investors.260 According to Carim, the government - as mentioned in the Preamble - considers the 
Investment Act to confirm South Africa’s maintained openness to foreign investments and to render 
comprehensive and effective protection whilst allowing the government to pursue a policy regime 
                                                                                                                                                            
253 Ibid. 
254 Bosman op cit note 233 at 14; including Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France, Austria, Belgium-
Luxembourg Economic Union, Denmark, Switzerland and Spain. 
255 Mossallam op cit note 248 at 4. 
256 Later renamed to Protection of Investment Bill. 
257 Bosman op cit note 233 at 14. 
258 Ibid. 
259 Ibid. 
260 See subsection 4 (a) of the Investment Act. 
 
  29 
appropriate to the specific socio-economic conditions and in compliance with the Constitution.261 
Foreign investors, in particular European investors, claimed that national legislation did not 
constitute a viable substitution for the terminated BITs, which would eventually result in a 
reduction of FDI flow into the South African economy.262  
In fact, one of the major aspects of an investment framework enshrined in national legislation as 
opposed to investment protection through IIAs, e.g. BITs, comprises of the fact that domestic 
legislation can be amended and changed unilaterally to the discretion of the government of the host 
country by virtue of its territorial sovereignty, whereas under IIAs neither party is capable of 
unilaterally doing so.263  
South Africa is not the only country, which conducted a BIT review aiming at the adoption of a 
narrower approach of investment protection.264 However, the Republic has not terminated the 
entirety of its BITs but maintained agreements with about 14 countries.265 Moreover, the terminated 
BITs provide for survival clauses, according to which runoff periods ensure on-going protection 
after termination of the BITs,266 which range from 10 to 20 years.267 In this regards, section 15 of 
the Investment Act provides for ‘transitional arrangements’ according to which ‘existing 
investments which were made under BITs will continue to be protected for the period and terms 
stipulated in the treaties’.268 However, according to section 15 (2) of the Investment Act any 
investment made after the promulgation of the Investment Act shall be subject thereto.  
1. Omitted Stipulations 
The Investment Act does not entail stipulations dealing with FET and MFN standards. The DTI 
stated in this regard, that the decision to exclude FET and MFN provisions constituted a risk 
mitigation effort by the government.269 Particularly the FET standard competed with the host state’s 
right to implement regulatory measures in the public interest and therefore limited the space for 
South Africa’s transformational policy agenda.270 South African stakeholders stated that the FET 
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standard needs to be included in order to bring the Investment Act in line with international 
practice; however a qualified FET standard, which allows for a greater right to regulate would be 
accepted.271 The DTI responded to these suggestions by stating that even the qualification of the 
scope of FET provisions did not appear to preclude arbitrators from basing claims on the notion of 
FET.272 Moreover, fair treatment was ensured by the rule of law and the Constitution.273 In terms of 
MFN treatment, the DTI stated that the inclusion of a MFN clause was only useful within the 
framework of an international treaty but not within the scope of national legislation.274 Besides, a 
MFN clause was superfluous as the Investment Act did not distinguish among investors based on 
their respective nationality but was applicable to every investor.275 The lack of these two provisions 
has great impact on several aspects of the protection of investment under the 2015 Investment Act 
as illustrated where applicable in the following paragraphs. 
2. Substantive Stipulations of the 2015 Protection of Investment Act No. 22 of 2015 
a. Right to Regulate 
The 2015 Investment Act is an overall expression of the South African government’s call for the 
preservation of greater policy space regarding the regulation of investments. Hence, this notion is 
expressly stipulated in section 12 of the Investment Act, which reads as follows: 
1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act, the government or any organ of state may, in 
accordance with the Constitution and applicable legislation, take measures, which may include 
(a) redressing historical, social and economic inequalities and injustices; 
(b) […] 
(c) upholding the rights guaranteed in the Constitution; 
(d) […] 
(e) fostering economic development, industrialisation and beneficiation; 
(f) achieving the progressive realisation of socio-economic rights; or  
(g) protecting the environment and the conservation and sustainable use of natural resources. 
1) The government or any organ of state may take measures that are necessary for the fulfilment of the 
Republic’s obligations in regard to the maintenance, compliance or restoration of international peace 
and security, or the protection of the security interests, 20 including the financial stability of the 
Republic.  
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According to the DTI this section reaffirmed the government’s right to regulate investments in the 
public interest and is to be read together with the other stipulations of the Investment Act, 
particularly with the national treatment and the protection of property clauses.276 The DTI is of the 
opinion that various BITs might challenge many affirmative actions, which the South African 
government did take and will take in the future, as internationally similar measures have been 
challenged already.277 In this regard, Gazzini also states that current BITs by and large imposed 
obligations almost exclusively upon the host states while according numerous rights to foreign 
investors.278 Multiple stakeholders however expressed concerns regarding this stipulation as it 
granted the government a virtually unlimited right to regulate in relation to an unlimited range of 
goals.279 The wide range of actions and the lack of clear definitions thereof opened the possibility of 
abusive conduct, even more so as the wording ‘any organ of state’ also allowed for state-owned 
enterprises to take measures.280  
Furthermore, the FET standard ordinarily provided by BITs protects the investor’s legitimate 
expectations. This requires the host state to act in a manner, which allows the foreign investor to 
know beforehand which rules and regulations will govern the investment in order to enable the 
foreign investor to plan its investment and comply with the respective rules. The same applies to 
expectations regarding the maintenance of pre-existing decisions or permits issued. The decisive 
framework is the existing legal framework at the time of the investment. Section 12 of the 
Investment Act, however, allows the government to take a virtually unlimited range of measures so 
that the rules and regulations governing foreign investment are highly unpredictable. However, the 
lack of sufficient regulatory space for host states under IIAs has been one of the leading arguments 
against IIAs.281 The limits placed on host states were too far-reaching and impeded the pursuit of 
public interests and inclusive growth and sustainable development policies.282 The manner in which 
the opposing interests are balanced constituted a strategic choice based on the preferences by the 
host state.283 Thus, section 12 of the Investment Act may be incompatible with the FET standard as 
commonly provided by BITs, it represents however a legitimate policy choice by the South African 
government. Nevertheless, section 12 of the Investment Act constitutes a deviation from the 
international practice of investment protection. 
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b. The Terms ‘Investor’ and ‘Investment’ 
According to section 1 of the Investment Act, the term ‘investor’ means  
‘an enterprise making an investment in the Republic regardless of nationality’. 
Hence, the Investment Act is equally applicable to investments by South African and foreign 
nationals. The Investment Act defines an investor as ‘an enterprise’, which is defined as ‘any 
natural person or juristic person, whether incorporated or unincorporated’.284 It has been criticised 
that the definition of the term ‘enterprise’ rendered no guidance as to the aspects constituting an 
enterprise.285 It was recommended to clarify the meaning of enterprise under the Investment Act, 
especially against the backdrop of different meanings within various South African legislation.286 
The DTI responded that it was willing to consider the inclusion of one particular definition287, 
however eventually refrained from doing so, which renders the scope and content unclear. The 
author therefore submits that in order to enhance clarification, the definition of an investor should 
differentiate between natural and juristic persons within the scope of the definition of an ‘investor’ 
and not within the scope of the definition of an ‘enterprise’. This would also be in line with the 
definition of an investor as ordinarily provided by BITs. Moreover, the scope of the term ‘making 
an investment’ is questionable. As mentioned above, BITs tend to extend the scope of protection to 
‘attempts or seeks to make an investment’ in order to ensure the protection of pre-establishment 
rights as for instance provided by the 2012 Model BIT.288 Section 2 of the Investment Act does not 
provide for pre-establishment protection; though it is not expressly excluded either. The Oxford 
English Dictionary defines ‘making’ as ‘the action of make in various senses: production, creation, 
construction, preparation; institution […], also (occasionally): the process of being made’.289 
According to this definition, it could be argued that the term ‘making’ covers pre-established rights. 
In terms of an ‘investment’ section 2 (1) of the Investment Act provides the following definition: 
‘(a) any lawful enterprise established, acquired or expanded by an investor in accordance with the 
laws of the Republic, committing resources of economic value over a reasonable period of time, in 
anticipation of profit; 
(b) the holding or acquisition of shares, debentures or other ownership instruments of such an 
enterprise; or 
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(c) the holding, acquisition or merger by such an enterprise with another enterprise outside the 
Republic to the extent that such holding, acquisition or merger […] has an effect on an investment 
contemplated by paragraphs (a) and (b) in the Republic;  
[…]’. 
In the following section 2 (2) of the Investment Act provides a non-exhaustive list of assets, which 
an enterprise may possess in terms of an investment.  
The present formulation follows the enterprise-based definition model, one of the options suggested 
by the 2012 SADC290 Model BIT.291 The enterprise-based approach requires the establishment or 
acquisition of an enterprise within the economic territory of the host state.292 It is a narrower 
concept than the asset-based approach, which is used by the vast majority of BITs and ordinarily 
covers ‘every kind of asset’ which leads to a virtually unlimited inclusion of everything of 
economic value.293 However, the asset-based approach has been subject to various international 
arbitration cases, which has given rise to concern regarding the scope of the definition.294 UNCTAD 
recommends for developing countries to use the enterprise-based approach in order to achieve an 
investment policy framework, which is focused on the enhancement of sustainable development and 
inclusive growth.295 According to UNCTAD, developing countries should adopt an investment 
framework, which ensures that protection is only rendered to investments which bring concrete 
benefits to the respective host economy.296 The enterprise-based approach only covers enterprises 
owned or controlled by an investor and thereby excludes contributions, which do not entail the 
transfer of financial and managerial control over the investment. Only investments which comprise 
of such a contribution will be warranted protection based on the greater commitment of resources 
and implicated risks.297 Moreover, the utilised definition provides for the exclusion of portfolio 
investments as those do not require an influence on the enterprise’s management.  
Another problematic aspect in respect of the investment definition is that section 2 (1) (a) of the 
Investment Act stipulates that the investment has to be made ‘in anticipation of profit’ which 
suggests that non-profit investments are excluded from the protective scope. Even though this fact 
has been criticised by the Banking Association of South Africa (BASA), the DTI did not comment 
on the reasons for the exclusion of non-profit investments.298 Similar stipulations in BITs ordinarily 
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include non-profit investments through formulations such as ‘in expectation of gains and profits’299 
or by keeping silent on this matter.300 The 2012 SADC Model BIT which has been used as a 
template for the Investment Act, does not provide for a differentiation between profit and non-profit 
investments within the enterprise-based definition model.301 Moreover, the 2016 Agreement on the 
Amendment of the 2006 SADC Protocol on Finance and Investment (FIP)302 provides within the 
scope of the definition of ‘enterprise’ ‘whether or not for profit’303, stating that non-profit 
investments are protected. Although the 2016 SADC FIP Amendment Agreement is not in force 
yet304, it constitutes a noteworthy fact as South Africa will be bound by the amending stipulations 
once the Amendment Agreement comes into force305 regardless of the actual adoption by South 
Africa.306 
Moreover, the formulation of section 2 (1) of the Investment Act requires the commitment of 
resources of economic value ‘over a reasonable period of time’. According to the DTI, the term 
‘reasonable period’ is meant to ensure that only investments, which contribute to the economic 
development objectives of the country are protected.307 The exact meaning and temporal duration of 
‘reasonable period’ depended on specific facts especially in relation to the respective economic 
sector.308 Moreover, the stipulation aimed at the explicit exclusion of portfolio investments as those 
were ordinarily not aiming at the achievement of long-term goals.309 
As a result, the definitions of ‘investor’ and ‘investment’ pursuant to the Investment Act differ in 
several aspects from the provisions ordinarily found in IIAs. This is likely to create ambiguity and 
uncertainty from a foreign investor’s perspective due to the limited scope of protection compared to 
previous BITs. Furthermore, the Investment Act is not entirely clear on the types of investments 
covered, which renders the security of foreign investments less predictable. However, some of the 
limitations appear necessary in order to create an investment climate aimed at the enhancement of 
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sustainable development and inclusive growth. The prevention of infringements of potential future 
investment policies promulgated by SADC would be beneficial as those only enhance the overall 
uncertainty regarding the protection of foreign investments under the Investment Act. Moreover, the 
exclusion of non-profit investments appears not advisable against the backdrop of their by and large 
charitable and educational purposes, which may constitute desirable forms of investment. 
c. National Treatment 
The Investment Act provides national treatment in section 8 (1) according to which  
‘[f]oreign investors and their investments must not be treated less favourably than South African 
investors in like circumstances.’ 
In the following, section 8 (2) determines a non-exhaustive list of aspects which have to be taken 
into consideration in terms of the determination of ‘like circumstances’: 
 For the purposes of this section, ‘like circumstances’ means the requirement for an overall  
 examination of the merits of the case by taking into account all the terms of a foreign investment,  
 including the 
 (a) effect of the foreign investment on the Republic, and the cumulative effects of all investments;  
 (b) sector that the foreign investments are in;  
 (c) aim of any measure relating to foreign investments; 
 (d) factors relating to the foreign investor or the foreign investment in relation to the measure 
concerned;  
 (e) effect on third persons and the local community;  
 (f) effect on employment; and  
 (g) direct and indirect effect on the environment.  
Section 8 (3) stipulates that ‘the examination referred to in subsection (2) must not be limited to or 
be biased towards any one factor’. 
According to the Memorandum of Clarification issued by the South African government regarding 
the text of the Protection of Investment Bill as of 3 November 2015 [B18B-2015], the national 
treatment clause is closely aligned to the Constitution, which allows for the government to take 
measures in order to overcome past discrimination.310 National treatment clauses entailed by BITs 
constituted unbearable risks in regards to the realization of national legislation objectives such as 
Black Economic Empowerment, public health, and environmental and economic development.311 
Moreover, it aimed at the enhancement of competitive equality between foreign and domestic 
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investors by only granting national treatment to foreign investors in the event that they were in fact 
in ‘like circumstances’ compared to national investors.312 The factors listed in section 8 (2) were 
suitable to assist in the determination thereof.313  
However, several stakeholders issued critical submissions mainly concerned with the definition of 
the term ‘like circumstances’.314 Even though section 8 (2) provided a list of factors which have to 
be taken into consideration in the course of the determination, uncertainties remained due to the  
broad and vague wording.315 For instance, the meaning of the term ‘sector’ is not explicitly defined, 
so that the specific content thereof is unclear. Besides, though section 8 (3) stipulates that the 
determination should not be limited by or biased towards the specified factors, it does not provide a 
comprehensive understanding of the ratio between the factors and their individual significance.  
Consequently, the manner of interpretation and application by the domestic courts remains 
uncertain due to the non-exhaustive character and broad wording of the provision.316 Especially in 
the event that the national judiciary adopted a relatively narrow approach, foreign investors might 
be de facto excluded from the extension of national treatment. 
Furthermore, section 8 (4) provides that  
 ‘Subsection (1) must not be interpreted in a manner that will require the Republic to extend to  
 foreign investors and their investments the benefit of any treatment, preference or privilege resulting 
 from 
 (a) taxation provisions in any international agreement or arrangement or any law of the Republic;  
 (b) government procurement processes;  
 (c) subsidies or grants provided by the government or any organ of state;  
 (d) any law or other measure, the purpose of which is to promote the achievement of equality in 
South Africa or designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, historically 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination on the basis of race, gender or disability in the Republic;  
 (e) any law or other measure, the purpose of which is to promote and preserve cultural heritage and 
practices, indigenous knowledge and biological resources related thereto, or national heritage; or  
 (f) any special advantages accorded in the Republic by development finance institutions established 
for the purpose of development assistance or the development of small and medium businesses 
or new industries.’ 
                                                
312 Summary of Submissions, op cit note 269 at DTI’s response in respect of ‘national treatment’. 
313 Ibid. 




  37 
Accordingly, foreign investors can be excluded from certain benefits accorded to domestic 
investors. The government admitted in this respect that the different treatment foreign and domestic 
investors might be ‘unavoidable’ in certain limited instances, which was however not contradictory 
to the principle of equal treatment but due to the government's right to implement legitimate policy 
measures in the public interest.317 As mentioned above, section 12 (1) stipulates a virtually 
unlimited right for the South African government or any organ of state to take certain regulatory 
measures regarding investments in the public interest, which is to be read together with section 8 
governing national treatment. Hence, the Investment Act stipulates that in the course of the 
determination of ‘like circumstances’ pursuant to section 8 (1), factors which enabled the 
government to conduct certain measures in accordance with section 12 (1) have to be taken into 
consideration. Therefore, measures which the government deems legitimate in respect of the public 
interest - subject to compliance with the Constitution and applicable legislation - ultimately 
constitute lawful reasons for the different treatment of foreign and domestic investors. As the 
government declared in the Memorandum of Clarification, this aims particularly at provisions in 
respect to BEE, public health, and environmental and economic development.318  
The rationale of rendering national treatment subject to national legislation therefore comprises of 
the prevention of foreign investors enjoying greater rights while avoiding legislation and regulatory 
measures applicable to domestic investor. However, simultaneously, foreign investors are not 
protected from rigorous measures taken against national investors, which under BITs is ensured 
through other standards of treatment319, particularly by FET and MFN clauses, which are not 
included in the Investment Act. Yet, as held in Pope & Talbot Inc v Canada320 the different 
treatment of national and foreign investors under national treatment clauses entailed by IIAs is 
lawful if a reasonable nexus to rational government policies is provided, which does not de facto 
distinguish between foreign and national companies. However, as stated above, the extent of 
differential treatment may not be greater than absolutely necessary. In this context it would 
moreover be beneficial if the Investment Act provided for a MFN clause ensuring the equal 
treatment of foreign investors, which are determined to be in ‘like circumstances’. 
Another critical factor is whether the national treatment clause is applicable only to post-
establishment rights or also to pre-establishment rights. As mentioned above, the majority of BITs 
stipulate that national treatment is only applicable to already established investments. The 
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Investment Act does not explicitly comment on this matter. However, when read together with 
section 7 (2) of the Investment Act, which states the Investment Act ‘does not create a right for a 
foreign investor or prospective foreign investor to establish an investment’, it becomes apparent that 
national treatment shall only apply to post-establishment rights.  
As a result, the national treatment provision of the Investment Act is by and large compatible with 
the national treatment clauses ordinarily stipulated by BITs provided that the South African 
government limits the differentiation between foreign and national investors to a rational minimum. 
d. Physical Security of Property 
BITs normally provide for ‘full protection and security’ of alien investments in order to grant 
protection from physical violence performed by state officials or third parties in relation to 
violations, which could be reasonably anticipated and prevented. This standard derives from the 
international minimum standard which required states to take responsibility for destruction or 
violence by non-state actors. 
The Investment Act deals with this matter in section 9, which reads as follows: 
‘The Republic must accord foreign investors and their investments a level of physical security as 
may be generally provided to domestic investors in accordance with minimum standards of 
customary international law and subject to available resources and capacity.’ 
This provision is critical with regard to several aspects. The Investment Act however, stipulates that 
the physical security of investments is ‘subject to available resources and capacity’. The 
formulation is unclear in that it is not evident whether the general physical protection of 
investments is dependent on the availability of the relevant resources and capacity or if this 
limitation is only applicable regarding the protection of foreign investments. Furthermore, section 9 
does not define the ‘level of protection’, which is to be granted to domestic investors, which 
consequently leaves foreign investors uncertain about the scope of physical protection accorded to 
them. Several stakeholders expressed their concerns about the wording of section 9 and submitted 
criticism to the DTI.321 The DTI responded to these submissions and stated that the stipulation 
sought to clarify that South Africa does not bear any greater obligation to foreign investors than to 
national investors in relation to the physical protection of investors.322 The physical protection of 
investments was conducted by the South African police and section 9 only sought to indicate that 
foreign nationals were entitled to the same level of protection.323 In essence, section 9 therefore 
rather constitutes a national treatment clause than an actual standard of ‘full protection and security’ 
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as ordinarily provided by the customary international law minimum standard and BITs. The 
stipulation does not provide virtual all-including physical protection of foreign investors from civil 
strife and violence by state and non-state actors but merely constitutes that foreign investors were 
entitled to the same scope of physical protection as domestic investors, which is further limited by 
the stipulation of an excuse on part of the state in the event of a lack of resources and capacity. The 
2012 SADC Model BIT, for instance, does provide for physical protection of foreign investments 
which may not be ‘less favourable’ than the protection accorded to domestic investors and therefore 
also links the scope of protection to the treatment accorded to domestic investors; it does however 
not provide for an excuse on part of the state due to a lack of resources and capacity.324 Also the 
2015 UNCTAD Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development provides that 
developing countries should include a ‘full protection and security’ clause but qualify its scope by 
expressly linking it to the customary international law standard or by expressly stating that only 
physical protection was covered.325  
Under customary international law the limitation of protection subject to available resources and 
capacity is generally not accepted. States cannot excuse themselves based on the assertion that the 
physical protection of the investment was not possible due to a lack of capacity or resources. The 
host state is in fact required to exercise due diligence in regard to the protection of alien property.  
Moreover, the majority of IIAs provides for the payment of restitution or compensation in the event 
of losses due to the physical violation of the foreign investment owed to civil strife, armed conflicts 
or riots.326 The 2013 PPIB stipulated such a payment of compensation, which is however not 
included in the 2015 Investment Act. 
Consequently, the scope of physical protection accorded to foreign investments pursuant to section 
9 of the Investment Act is unjustifiably lower than the ‘full protection and security’ standard 
provided by the customary international law minimum standard and respective clauses in BITs. 
e. Legal Protection of Property 
The section dealing with the matter of the legal protection of property and therefore ultimately with 
the question of expropriation under the Investment Act is section 10. This section states that 
‘Investors have the right to property in terms of section 25 of the Constitution.’ 
Therefore, the question of a lawful expropriation is subject to section 25 of the South African 
Constitution, which reads as follows: 
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‘(1) No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, and no law 
may permit arbitrary deprivation of property.  
(2) Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of general application 
 (a) for a public purpose or in the public interest; and  
 (b) subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time and manner of payment of  
 which have either been agreed to by those affected or decided or approved by a court.  
(3) The amount of the compensation and the time and manner of payment must be just and equitable, 
reflecting an equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of those affected, having 
regard to all relevant circumstances, including 
 (a) the current use of the property;  
 (b) the history of the acquisition and use of the property;  
 (c) the market value of the property;  
 (d) the extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the acquisition and beneficial capital  
 improvement of the property; and  
 (e) the purpose of the expropriation.  
(4) For the purposes of this section 
  (a) the public interest includes the nation’s commitment to land reform, and to reforms to  
  bring about equitable access to all South Africa’s natural resources; and  
  (b) property is not limited to land.  
(5) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to 
foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis. 
[…] 
(8) No provision of this section may impede the state from taking legislative and other measures to 
achieve land, water and related reform, in order to redress the results of past racial discrimination, 
provided that any departure from the provisions of this section is in accordance with the provisions 
of section . 
  […]’ 
i. Legality of Direct and Indirect Expropriation 
The DTI explained that the rationale for the formulation of section 10 comprised of the fact that 
section 25 of the Constitution contained sufficient details regarding the subject matter of 
expropriation.327 However, the initial 2013 Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill (PPIB) 
contained a section named ‘Principles relating to expropriation of investment’ which gave more 
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details on the new approach to expropriation of alien assets under domestic legislation. Though it 
was removed in both following draft Bills, scrutiny of this extinguished section is valuable with 
regard to a better understanding of the motives and considerations of the policy drafters.328 Notably, 
the 2013 PPIB included a non-exhaustive list of measures which were considered not to amount to 
expropriation329, such as ‘measures and series of measures […] that have an incidental or indirect 
adverse impact on the economic value of an investment’330 and measures ‘aimed at protecting and 
enhancing legitimate public welfare objectives’331. This motivation is also depicted by the findings 
of the DTI in the BIT review process, which declare that the failure of BITs to effectively 
distinguish between regulation and expropriation would allow for legitimate government 
regulations to be classified as indirect expropriations.332 
However, section 25 of the Constitution distinguishes between ‘deprivation’ (section 25 (1)) and 
‘expropriation’ (section 25 (2)), but does not give a clear definition of the scope and content of 
these terms. In First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue 
Service and Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance333 the 
Constitutional Court came to the conclusion that deprivation constituted a genus, while 
expropriation is a species, i.e. a subset thereof.334 This interpretation by the Constitutional Court 
suggests that basically any kind of interference with the usage, the benefits or the exploitation of 
private property might potentially constitute a form of deprivation.335 As mentioned above, in Agri 
SA v The Minister for Minerals and Energy336 the Constitutional Court extended these findings by 
stating that other than deprivation, an expropriation compulsorily required the acquisition of the 
property or rights in relation thereto by the state.337 Moreover, expropriation could only occur in the 
public interest and against payment of compensation; deprivation however already occurred in the 
event that property or rights therein were taken away or significantly interfered with and did not 
require compensation.338 Therefore, certain additional requirements had to be met for deprivation to 
rise to the level of expropriation.339 
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Consequently, section 25 (1) of the Constitution allows for a taking of or interference with property 
and rights in relation thereto which will not trigger recourse or compensation claims in favour of the 
affected person. Only in the event that the state itself directly ceases property or rights therein, 
section 25 (2) of the Constitution will be applicable. Expropriations therefore have to be in line with 
both requirements of section 25 (1) and section 25 (2).340  
However, as mentioned above, direct expropriations nowadays constitute a rather seldom 
occurrence, which reinforces the importance of indirect expropriations. For instance, the cumulative 
effect of a series of measures taken by the host government leading to a reduction of the 
investment’s economic value is acknowledged to potentially constitute indirect expropriation in the 
form of ‘creeping expropriation’ under international investment protection law.341 Notably, this 
conduct has been one of the measures, which the South African government attempted to exclude 
from the scope of measures deemed to amount to the level of expropriation under the 2013 PPIB.342 
Moreover, international investment protection law recognises that ‘regulatory expropriation’ may 
constitute a form of indirect expropriation. A ‘regulatory expropriation’ is constituted in the event 
that the host state implements a regulatory measure which is arbitrary and discriminatory in regards 
to its character or manner of implementation or which is in violation of an obligation undertaken by 
the state.343 Section 8 (2) (b) of the 2013 PPIB however provided that state measures, which aimed 
at the protection and enhancement of legitimate public welfare objectives, were not tantamount to 
expropriation without making reference to requirements such as non-discrimination and fairness. 
Therefore, the 2013 PPIB appears to aim at the preclusion of compensation claims in respect of 
legal or administrative governmental actions, which by and large constitute measures defined as 
indirect expropriation under international investment protection law. Even though these stipulations 
were removed in later draft Bills and are not part of the 2015 Investment Act, they are worth noting 
in regards of the overall objective of the new South African approach towards foreign investments.  
As explained above, it is accepted under international law that states are generally entitled to 
expropriate alien assets due to their territorial and economic sovereignty. However, both direct and 
indirect expropriation can only be lawful in the event that the conduct serves a public purpose, is 
performed in a non-arbitrary and non-discriminatory manner, complies with applicable law and due 
process and is conducted against the payment of compensation. The South African Constitution 
provides that expropriation in terms of subsection 25 (2) of the Constitution was required to be 
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performed in terms of a law of general application, for a public purpose or in the public interest and 
against payment of compensation.344 As mentioned above, according to the Constitutional Court in 
Agri SA v The Minister for Minerals and Energy only direct takings of foreign property and rights 
therein by the state would rise to the level of expropriation under subsection 25 (2) of the 
Constitution. Thus, under the South African Constitution only direct expropriations are subject to 
the requirements, which under international investment protection law are equally applicable to 
indirect expropriation. An action by the state, which would constitute indirect expropriation under 
international investment law, is merely subject to subsection 25 (1) of the Constitution and can 
therefore be readily performed in terms of a law of general application and under the provision of a 
non-arbitrary manner independent from a compulsory payment of compensation. 
In essence, the Constitutional Court in Agri SA v The Minister for Minerals and Energy therefore 
precluded the acknowledgement of indirect expropriations as a trigger for recourse and 
compensation under the South African Constitution. The customary international minimum 
standard however determines as one of the criteria for a lawful expropriation, regarding both direct 
and indirect, that it can only be conducted legally against the payment of compensation. 
Accordingly, every indirect expropriation performed in terms of subsection 25 (1) of the 
Constitution would be illegal under customary international law as it did not meet the requirements 
of the customary international minimum standard. However, section 232 of the Constitution 
provides that 
‘[c]ustomary international law is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an 
Act of Parliament.  
Thus, the requirement of the international minimum standard of payment of compensation in 
respect of indirect expropriation does not rise to the level of law in South Africa as it is in conflict 
with subsection 25 (1) of the Constitution. This fact is particularly problematic as customary 
international law derives from the practice of nations and expresses an opinio juris within the 
international community that the respective principle requires obligatory acceptance.345 Moreover, 
section 233 of the Constitution declares that  
‘[w]hen interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable interpretation of the 
legislation that is consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation that is 
inconsistent with international law.’  
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Section 233 hence elevates international law above domestic law whereas section 232 states that 
customary international law must be consistent with the constitution. This appears contradictory, 
especially due to the fact that customary international law forms a significant party of international 
law.346 In fact, the non-compliance by a state with established international law principles can be 
challenged in international courts in respect of the denial of justice.347 In this regard, the Permanent 
Court of International Justice concluded in the Treatment of Polish Nationals and Other Persons of 
Polish Origin or Speech in the Danzig Territory case, that  
‘according to generally accepted principles, a State cannot rely, as against another State, on the 
provisions of the latter's Constitution, but only on international law and international obligations 
duly accepted, […] and conversely, a State cannot adduce as against another State its own 
Constitution with a view to evading obligations incumbent upon it under international law or treaties 
in force.’348 
Thus, governmental measures, which would rise to a level tantamount to indirect expropriation 
under international law but not under the South African legal system could theoretically be 
challenged on an international level in regards to the non-payment of compensation. 
Another critical factor in this regard comprises of the lacking FET standard. As stated by the 
Tecmed tribunal it is part of the investor's legitimate expectations covered by the FET standard that 
the host state will not deprive the investor of its investment without the required compensation. 
Thus, indirect expropriation without payment of compensation might potentially constitute a breach 
of the FET standard ordinarily stipulated by BITs. As stated above, the Investment Act does not 
provide for FET, which hence simultaneously lowers the level of protection regarding 
expropriation. The same applies to the MFN standard. As South Africa has still BITs in force, 
which provide for the payment of compensation349, foreign investors were normally entitled to base 
claims on the MFN standard under the assertion that foreign investors of third countries were 
treated more favourably. In order to prevent discrimination and to provide a ‘level playing ground’ 
the host country would be obliged to accord the same treatment to all foreign investors. The fact 
that the Investment Act does not provide MFN treatment therefore adds to the low level of 
protection against indirect expropriation. 
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ii. Manner of Calculation of Compensation 
Another critical issue is the manner in which the compensation is to be calculated. As seen above, 
section 10 of Investment Act merely refers to section 25 of the Constitution, which stipulates in 
subsection 25 (3) that the amount of the compensation as well as the time and manner of payment 
must be ‘just and equitable, reflecting an equitable balance between the public interest and the 
interests of those affected’.350 In the following, subsection 25 (3) of the Constitution gives a non-
exhaustive list of factors, which have to be taken into consideration in the course of determination. 
Notably, ‘the market value of the property’351 is only one of a number of factors, which have to be 
taken into account amongst others such as the current and historical use of the property and the 
purpose of the expropriation. 
However, as mentioned above, the vast majority of BITs provides for the calculation of the 
compensation based on ‘fair market value’ or ‘genuine value’ of the asset in question. Moreover, 
BITs ordinarily provide for the application of the Hull Formula, according to which the payable 
compensation has to be ‘prompt, adequate and effective’. 
The formulation of section 25 (3) of the Constitution therefore allows for the South African 
government to provide less than full market value. Even though this does not necessarily mean that 
South Africa will always pay compensation below fair market value, it at least opens up the 
possibility to do so, which has been previously precluded by South Africa’s BITs, which provided 
compensation based on fair market value.352 Chidede also states in this regard that the assurance of 
the payment of full market value was more beneficial from a foreign investor’s perspective as the 
determination of a just and equitable compensation was ‘less predictable and more open to political 
influence’.353 It is to stress however that the method of calculation in relation to compensation, 
despite its vast usage in IIAs and BITs, does not rise to the level of customary international law.354 
For instance, UNCTAD recommends for developing countries to use terms such as ‘just’ or ‘fair’ 
and ‘based on equitable balance between public and private interests (where the fair market value of 
investment is only one of the factors to be taken into account)’ in order to enhance flexibility in 
terms of the calculation.355 Accordingly, it is a legitimate policy choice for the South African 
government to determine a calculation method deviating from the manner of calculation provided 
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by the previous BITs, which does nonetheless increase uncertainty from a foreign investor’s 
perspective.  
However, the 2006 SADC FIP provides for ‘prompt, adequate and effective compensation’.356 The 
2016 SADC Agreement Amending Annex 1 of the Protocol on Finance and Investment 
(Amendment Agreement) conversely, now provides for ‘fair and adequate’ compensation, which is 
to be assessed ‘in relation to the fair market value of the expropriated investment immediately 
before the expropriation took place’.357 It continues by stating that, ‘where appropriate, the 
assessment of fair and adequate compensation shall be based on an equitable balance between the 
public interest and interests of those affected’, which requires to take into account a number of 
factors which are listed in the following.358 The factors entailed therein are by and large the same as 
those entailed in section 25 (3) of the South African Constitution. Nevertheless, the Amendment 
Agreement generally acknowledges that the compensation should be calculated by means of the fair 
market value. Accordingly, the stipulations by the Amendment Agreement are conflicting with the 
South African Constitution. As the Amendment Agreement will come into force regardless of the 
adoption by South Africa, provided that the required number of member states adopts the 
Amendment Agreement, it could qualify as ‘an agreement which does not require either ratification 
or accession’ in terms of section 231 (3) of the Constitution. Accordingly, the Amendment 
Agreement would potentially ‘bind[s] the Republic without approval by the National Assembly and 
the National Council of Provinces […]’.359 According to section 231 (4)  
‘[a]ny international agreement becomes law in the Republic when it is enacted into law by national 
legislation; but a self-executing provision of an agreement that has been approved by Parliament is 
law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament.’  
These two sections appear contradictory, as the Amendment Agreement would likely bind South 
Africa after its entry into force but it would only become law subject to section 231 (4) of the 
Constitution. It is therefore highly uncertain if and if so, in which manner South Africa will give 
effect to the provisions of the Amendment Agreement and in which ways this will influence the 
South African investment framework.  
As a result, the legal protection of investment provision of the Investment Act and the scope of 
protection provided by section 25 of the Constitution fall short of the scope of protection provided 
for by customary international law and BITs. Although the reasons for the decision to overhaul the 
previous foreign investment approach on part of the South African government - redress regarding 
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the enduring racial injustice and cruel suppression of black South Africans during Apartheid - are 
comprehensible and sensible, the provided mechanisms are in conflict with customary international 
law and potential regional agreements. Thus, there is a realistic chance that these provisions will be 
challenged on an international or subregional level. In any event, the legal framework regarding 
expropriation is highly uncertain and vague, particularly regarding indirect actions. 
iii. Timing and Manner of Compensation Payment 
Another critical factor is the timing and manner of the compensation payment. Section 25 (3) of the 
Constitution provides that the ‘time and manner of payment must be just and equitable, reflecting an 
equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of those affected’ under reference to 
a non-exhaustive list of aspects which are to be taken into consideration. The vast majority of BITs 
utilises the Hull Formula which stipulates that compensation payment must be ‘prompt, adequate 
and effective’ in order to provide foreign investors with predictability and stability regarding the 
compensation payment. Section 25 (3) however entails much less predictability as the timing and 
manner is dependent on many factors, whilst the application thereof may be inconsistent and 
incoherent due to a lack of sufficient ascertainment. Furthermore, the specific weight of the factors 
in relation to each other is unclear, which leaves foreign investors incapable of determining the 
concrete conditions regarding timing and manner. However, as mentioned above, the Hull Formula 
does not rise to the level of customary international law. It therefore depicts a legitimate policy 
choice on part of the South African government to pursue a different approach, which nevertheless 
adds to the uncertainty and unpredictability of the Investment Act. In this respect again, a MFN 
clause would have been beneficial in order to ensure the equal treatment of foreign investors. 
f. Transfer of Funds 
In terms of transfer of funds, section 11 of the Investment Act states 
‘[a] foreign investor may, in respect of an investment, repatriate funds subject to taxation and other 
applicable legislation.’ 
According to the Memorandum of Clarification, section 11 of the Investment Act clarified that 
South Africa had a liberal transfer regime, which allowed for foreign investors to repatriate returns 
on their investments, subject to taxation and other applicable legislation.360 Several stakeholders 
however argued that the formulation of section 11 was too broad and vague as no clear definition of  
the scope and content of the terms ‘funds’ and ‘other applicable legislation’ was given.361 
Furthermore, the stipulation’s formulation did not constitute an explicit right to transfer funds, 
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which can be asserted vis-à-vis South Africa.362 This fact was likely to create a major obstacle to 
foreign investments in South Africa.363 The DTI responded that the right to transfer funds was 
unequivocal.364 This aspect does not become clear from the formulation of section 11. As stated 
above, the main disadvantage from a foreign investor’s perspective of a national investment 
protection framework is that it allows for unilateral changes on part of the host state as an 
expression of its territorial sovereignty. Due to the fact that the transfer of funds is ‘subject to 
taxation and other applicable legislation’, it is to the discretion of the South African government to 
alter taxation and the respective domestic legislation, which leaves foreign investors with only 
limited predictability in regard thereto. It will therefore be decisive that the South African 
government limits changes regarding taxation and applicable legislation to rational and reasonable 
alterations. However, in the event that the government would fail to do so, foreign investors could 
potentially base claims on the national treatment clause of section 8 of the Investment Act. 
g. Dispute Resolution 
The scope and content of provisions regarding the subject matter of dispute resolution are another 
decisive factor, which foreign investors take into account in the course of determining a suitable 
investment venue.  
The Investment Act deals with dispute resolution in section 13, which reads as follows:  
(1) An investor that has a dispute in respect of action taken by the government, which action affected an 
investment of such foreign investor, may within six months of becoming aware of the dispute request the 
Department to facilitate the resolution of such dispute by appointing a mediator.  
(2) (a) The Department must maintain a list of qualified mediators of high moral character and 
recognised competence in the fields of law, commerce, industry or finance, who may be relied upon to 
exercise independent judgment and who are willing and able to serve as mediators.  
 (b) The mediator must be appointed by agreement between the government and the foreign investor 
 (hereinafter referred to as the parties) from the list contemplated in paragraph (a), or, in the absence 
 of a list, from individuals proposed by either party. 
 […] 
 (d) Recourse to mediation must be governed by the prescribed rules and any prescribed time limit 
 may be adjusted by agreement between the disputing parties.  
[…] 
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(4) Subject to applicable legislation, an investor, upon becoming aware of a dispute as referred to in 
subsection (1), is not precluded from approaching any competent court, independent tribunal or statutory 
body within the Republic for the resolution of a dispute relating to an investment.  
(5) The government may consent to international arbitration in respect of investments covered by this 
Act, subject to the exhaustion of domestic remedies. The consideration of a request for international 
arbitration will be subject to the administrative processes set out in section 6. Such arbitration will be 
conducted between the Republic and the home state of the applicable investor.  
i. Domestic Dispute Resolution 
Accordingly, under the Investment Act the investor is provided with a choice to either request the 
South African government to facilitate the dispute resolution by means of mediation365 or to bring 
the dispute to a competent court, independent tribunal or statutory body within South Africa.366 The 
Investment Act does however not provide for international investor-state arbitration, which is 
ordinarily provided in BITs.  
According to the DTI, there was no general conclusive reason, which would prohibit the review of a 
foreign investor’s claim by the judiciary of the host state.367 In fact, direct access to international 
arbitration illustrated a ‘blatant disregard’ for the South African legal system, which allowed South 
Africa to preserve its policy space.368 However, several stakeholders submitted comments stating 
that the review of executive measures in relation to investments by the South African courts was 
inconsistent with the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.369 In International Trade 
Administration Commission v Scaw South Africa (Pty) Ltd.370, the Constitutional Court held that 
‘the power to formulate and implement domestic and international trade policy […] resides in the 
heartland of national executive authority’.371 The Constitutional Court further stated that 
‘[w]hen a court is invited to intrude into the terrain of the executive, […] it must do so only in the 
clearest of cases and only when irreparable harm is likely to ensue if interdictory relief is not granted. 
This is particularly true when the decision entails multiple considerations of national policy choices and 
specialist knowledge, in regard to which courts are ill-suited to judge.372 […] Courts may not without 
justification trench upon the polycentric policy terrain of international trade and its concomitant foreign 
relations or diplomatic considerations reserved by the Constitution for the national executive.’373 
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According to these statements by the Constitutional Court, the doctrine of separation of powers 
renders South African domestic courts incompetent to judge regulatory measures implemented by 
the executive. Hence, the determination of South African domestic courts judging disputes in 
relation to the implementation of regulatory measures in regard to investment is inconsistent with 
the doctrine of separation of powers and therefore, strictly speaking, incompatible with the South 
African Constitution. 
Notwithstanding this unconstitutionality, section 13 (1) of the Investment Act moreover raises 
concerns regarding the lack of determined time limits governing the period in which the DTI has to 
initiate mediation proceedings following the request by the aggrieved investor.374 Section 13 (1) 
merely stipulates a time limit in terms of the investor who is entitled to request dispute resolution 
vis-à-vis the DTI within six months following awareness of the dispute. Hence, it is entirely to the 
discretion of the government when it will respond to the request by the investor. Besides, section 13 
(1) of the Investment Act does not stipulate a binding obligation by the DTI to take action following 
the request at all. Section 13 (4) stipulates that investors may approach courts, tribunals or statutory 
bodies at any time subject to applicable legislation and therefore guarantees access to justice for 
aggrieved investors as stipulated by section 34 of the Constitution provided that legal actions are 
admissible under applicable legislation.  Nevertheless, gauging from its stipulation in subsection 
(1), mediation initiated by the DTI is supposed to constitute the primary dispute resolution 
mechanism. Against this backdrop it is to state that subsection (1) in itself is insufficient as it lacks 
guarantee of access to justice; even more so as the Investment Act does not provide for FET 
treatment. Generally, the provisions governing the domestic dispute resolution appear to aim at the 
prevention of precise recourse claims for investors due to a general lack of concrete determination 
thereof. Section 13 (1) by and large renders the question of recourse via mediation dependent on the 
government’s discretion, while section 13 (4) subjects the access to courts, tribunals and statutory 
bodies to applicable legislation, which is not further defined or determined. As a result, the investor-
state dispute resolution mechanisms provided for by the Investment Act fall short of the standard 
ordinarily provided for by BITs. The provisions significantly lack certainty and predictability. 
ii. International Arbitration 
The Investment Act only allows for international arbitration between South Africa and the 
respective home state of the investor, and only in the event that the South African government 
expresses its consent therewith subject to prior exhaustion of domestic remedies.  
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The DTI substantiated the new dispute resolution policy with the argument that the majority of 
investor-state arbitration outcomes were decided in favour of the investor and to the detriment of 
the host country.375 Particularly developing countries suffered from investor-state dispute settlement 
(ISDS) due to the high number of arbitration claims brought against them and the investor-biased 
outcomes of international arbitration.376  
These assertions by the DTI have been challenged by several stakeholders377 - they are however not 
entirely false. According to the UNCTAD World Investment Report 2016 only 40% of the ISDS 
cases were brought against developed countries.378 In terms of the results of concluded cases, total 
as of the end of 2015, 36% were decided in favour of the state and 27% in favour of the investor.379 
These numbers have been brought forward by several stakeholders in order to refute the DTI’s 
assertions.380 However, it is to stress that in regards to the total of cases, which have been decided 
on the merits, 60% were decided in favour of the investor. About half of the decisions made in 
favour of the state were dismissed due to a lack of jurisdiction.381  
According to the DTI, the resolution of investment disputes on an investor-state basis allowed for 
the assessment of vital national regulatory measures on the basis of mere commercial interests 
inconsistent with constitutional provisions.382 It thus put South Africa’s policy space, especially in 
regard to developmental policies, ‘at great risk’ if the Investment Act provided ISDS.383 State-state 
arbitration, on the contrary, was more beneficial in this regard as states were ‘presumably less likely 
to challenge certain types of regulatory measures’, particularly due to the fact that arguments made 
by states could be equally brought against them in the future.384 Furthermore, the provision for 
state-state arbitration constituted a concrete application of customary international law according to 
which states had the right to bring claims on behalf of their nationals in the event of a breach of 
international law by another state.385  
However, this fact renders the provision for state-state arbitration in domestic legislation essentially 
superfluous and meaningless as states do have the right to take actions on behalf of their nationals 
in any event as part of the doctrine of diplomatic protection. In fact, ISDS superseded state-state 
disputes due to the fact that it enables investors to have a legal standing vis-à-vis a state party, 
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which was considered to ‘depoliticise’ the process.386 By granting the investor legal standing, the 
dispute did not develop into a dispute between the host and home state, whose relationship was 
hence not affected in any way. Instead, the investor was granted access to a neutral and unbiased 
arbitration tribunal, which is independent from political or economic climate prevalent in the 
respective states.387 In fact, under the Investment Act the investor is obliged to lobby its home 
government to institute proceedings in relation to the dispute; the investor is however not 
guaranteed that the home state would actually do so.388 Diplomatic protection by the home state 
does not constitute an absolute right a citizen has but lies exclusively within the discretion of the 
home state.389 The institution of proceedings against another state might contradict or complicate 
the home state’s foreign policies and hence prevent it from taking actions.390 Thus, from the 
investor’s perspective, ISDS is much more beneficial as it provides greater certainty and 
predictability regarding the settlement of disputes. 
Moreover, subsection 13 (5) of the Investment Act provides that the South African government 
‘may consent’ to international arbitration. Against the backdrop of the findings of the DTI review, it 
does not appear very likely that South Africa will readily declare its consent thereto. Moreover, the 
fact that domestic remedies have to be exhausted first, leaves the investor with even greater 
uncertainty due to the long and unpredictable duration of this process. As the conduct of 
international arbitration is already subject to the consent of South Africa, the cumulation of both 
these limiting requirements are too restricted and unsatisfactory. 
Even in the unlikely event that South Africa would declare its consent, it has to be stressed that only 
the violation of customary international law or stipulations of an international treaty can constitute 
the subject of international arbitration.391 Claims could therefore be based on the assertion of a 
violation of the customary international minimum standard. However, South Africa has not 
terminated the entirety of its BITs, which may result in the different treatment of foreign investors 
depending on the maintenance of BITs, the run-off period pursuant to the terminated BITs and the 
provisions entailed by the respective treaty. However, the tribunal in Plama Consortium392 held that 
the MFN standard was not applicable to procedural rights, i.e. despite settlement provisions, so that 
even in the event that the Investment Act included such a standard claims could not be based on it. 
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As a result, section 13 (5) of the Investment Act leaves investors with uncertainty and 
unpredictability, even more so as the Investment Act does not determine applicable rules or 
arbitration centre. However, the system of ISDS is currently experiencing a legitimacy crisis 
including calls arguing in favour of a complete overhaul of the investment arbitration system.393 
The main concerns comprise of additional legal and financial risks, too far-reaching rights for 
foreign investors compared to domestic investors, inacceptable facts regarding the course of 
domestic policy development, inconsistent arbitral awards and a lack of transparency.394 Against 
this backdrop, the decision by the South African government to primarily provide for domestic 
dispute resolution is understandable. However, it would have been preferable to keep the door open 
for investor-state arbitration due to the ‘politisation’ of investment disputes if resolved on a state-
state basis. In any event, the provision regarding state-state arbitration is too limited and very 
unlikely to contribute to the subject matter of dispute resolution. Despite the comprehensible 
motives on part of South Africa, section 13 of the Investment Act therefore falls short of the 
standard normally provided by BIT. 
V. PROGNOSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The promulgation of the Investment of Protection Act No. 22 of 2015 has brought many changes in 
regard to the investment policy framework in South Africa. It is questionable which implications 
these changes will have for the investor confidence regarding future investments in South Africa. 
As the previous findings show, the 2015 Investment Act creates uncertainty and unpredictability in 
many of the areas governed. However, it is important to note that South Africa’s foreign investment 
framework does not only comprise of the 2015 Investment Act but includes various other 
legislation - parts of which are also being reviewed, such as e.g. the Expropriation Bill [B 4-2015], 
the International Arbitration Bill [B 10-2017] - and particularly BEE-related legislation such as the 
MPRDA and the Mining Charter. The content and impact on foreign investment by this legislation 
is partially not yet clear, which impedes the assessment of the South African investment 
environment for foreign investors. 
In 2017, South Africa was rated ‘junk’ status, which essentially means ‘non-investment grade’ or 
‘speculative’ mainly based on the assertion of poor governance and weak economy.395 Although 
South Africa offers attractive business opportunities, the increasing political risk regarding doing 
business in the country involves the threat of distressing policy and legislative alterations, which is 
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expected to continue at least until the elections in 2019.396 Thus, foreign investors assessing the 
South African investment climate would have reason to have little confidence regarding the stability 
and security of investments. It is therefore questionable if the enhancement of doubts and 
uncertainty by the termination of BITs was advisable, particularly against the background that the 
subject matter of attracting investment is part of the Nine Point Plan to reignite economic growth as 
presented in the State of Nation Address 2017 by State President Jacob G. Zuma.397 It is noteworthy 
however that South Africa managed to re-enter the 2017 A.T. Kearney Foreign Direct Investment 
Confidence Index for the first time since 2014.398 The report states that the outlook for the attraction 
of foreign direct investments in South Africa was mixed as the country, on the one hand, faced 
struggles relating to good governance and a volatile exchange rate but, on the other hand, was 
expecting GDP growth and still remained the gateway to Sub-Saharan Africa.399  
However, according to the UNCTAD World Investment Report 2017, South Africa was still 
underperforming regarding the inflow of foreign direct investment in 2016, which amounted to $2.3 
billion.400 Even though this constitutes an augmentation of 31% from the 2015 record low, this 
result was still significantly lower than the past average.401 UNCTAD stated that the main reason 
for the 2015 low was ‘lacklustre economic performance, lower commodity prices and higher 
electricity costs’.402 The OECD states that the confidence in the South African economy is already 
low due to political uncertainty, which might inhibit private investments even further in 2017 and 
2018.403 
Moreover, it is important to state that in 2016 foreign direct investment flows into other Sub-
Saharan African countries, especially Angola and Nigeria, significantly increased.404 Particularly 
Angola received almost seven times as much FDIs as South Africa, whereas Nigeria received 
approximately twice the amount of South Africa.405 Although South Africa is still considered to 
constitute the ‘gateway’ to Sub-Saharan Africa, the fact that its regional counterparts experience 
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economic strengthening and become noticeably more attractive as investment venues cannot be 
ignored. 
According to Guzman, already the mere fact of the termination of international bilateral agreements 
in itself is likely to send a negative signal to the international community as government decisions 
which are non-compliant with international law are able to damage a country’s reputation.406 The 
mere decision to terminate BITs and the implementation of domestic legislation as such is not 
incompatible with international law. It might however be perceived as a positioning outside of the 
international business community. Thus, it might have been preferable for South Africa to 
renegotiate the content of the respective BITs in order to tailor treaties appropriate to the country’s 
socio-economic needs instead of terminating them. Gazzini also states that BITs constituted a 
flexible framework, which would allow for renegotiations modifying the respective commitments 
according to changing conditions and needs, or alternatively, for the adoption of binding common 
interpretations of the content and application of certain provisions.407 Additionally, South Africa’s 
stay within the international regulatory framework would have allowed for the country to 
significantly contribute to and take a decisive role regarding the development of third generation 
BITs.408 Furthermore, the renegotiating of the BITs would have enabled South African investors, 
who make investments in another treaty country, to equally benefit from the protection offered by 
the treaties due to the reciprocity thereof.409 By terminating or not renewing BITs South Africa 
might protect some of its national interests vis-à-vis foreign investors, it does however equally 
weaken the range of protection rendered to investments by its own nationals in foreign countries.410 
Moreover, Steenkamp states that the South African government’s decision to ‘opt out’ of 
international arbitration might simultaneously demolish the currently established separation of legal 
and political relations on an international level as South African investors were deprived of the 
possibility to enforce investment related claims in foreign countries independently from the South 
African government.411  
From a foreign investor’s perspective, the factors mentioned above are likely to trigger a decline in 
foreign investor confidence regarding the stability and security of the South African investment 
framework. Particularly the overall poor economic development displayed by declining GDP 
growth and deteriorating inflow of foreign investment over the past years paired with increasing 
political instability and growing government consumption are likely to negatively impact the 
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foreign investors’ sentiments. 412  Combined with the significantly lower scope of protection 
rendered by the 2015 Investment Act, there is large foundation for doubts and concerns on part of 
investors. Particularly investors from countries with whom South Africa previously had BITs will 
be adversely affected after the expiration of the survival clauses. In order to prevent disinvestment 
by those investors, the South African government will have to act prudently regarding the utilisation 
of the preserved policy space in order to enhance investor confidence and ensure on-going capital 
inflow to the economy. In general, the manner in which the South African government will apply 
the applicable legislation and harness the preserved policy space will be decisive regarding the 
maintenance of already established and the making of future investments. The government will be 
forced to carefully contemplate future policy and legislative actions in order to assure foreign 
investors that the preserved regulatory space will not be used in an arbitrary or discriminatory 
fashion, which might put foreign investments at risk.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Protection of Investment Act No. 22 of 2015 is aiming to provide an investment framework 
which facilitates the redress of the historical racial and discriminatory injustices of the Apartheid 
era prior to 1994. In order to achieve this, the South African Constitution puts restraints on private 
property rights in some instances and the South African government has introduced various 
legislation and policy measures serving the purpose of BEE, the enhancement of equality of all 
South African citizen, and sustainable development and inclusive growth. In the government’s view 
the previous BITs did not sufficiently allow for the facilitation of these vital domestic policy 
measures due to too limited policy space. On the contrary, by means of BITs, and particularly 
international investor-state arbitration, the exercise of crucial national legislative measures was 
inhibited and exposed to interests non-consistent with the domestic socio-economic needs. The 
Investment Act, however, was aligned with these findings and allowed for the necessary policy 
space on part of the government.  
It is undisputed that the rectification of the wrongdoings during the Apartheid regime is essential 
and the decision to terminate BITs and to implement national investment protection legislation 
constitutes a legitimate and lawful policy choice. However, foreign direct investment still constitute 
a major catalyst for economic growth in developing countries due to the inflow of foreign capital. 
The Investment Act however provides a substantially lower scope of protection regarding foreign 
investments in comparison to the previous BITs in terms of crucial elements such as fair and 
equitable treatment, most-favoured nation treatment and investor-state dispute settlement. 
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Moreover, the Investment Act and the South African Constitution determine a significantly 
narrower concept of expropriation, whilst lacking provisions regarding compulsory payment of 
compensation in terms of indirect measures, and a limited concept of full protection and security. 
These stipulations are essentially incompatible with the respective requirements of the customary 
international minimum standard. Thus, South Africa’s commitment to international law is likely to 
be interpreted as rather moderate, which might affect the country’s reputation and perception within 
the international economic community. It is questionable if non-compliance with international state 
practice is advisable, particularly against the background that South Africa’s GDP growth and the 
inflow of foreign investment have been deteriorating over the past years whereas political instability 
and government consumption is constantly increasing.  
Therefore, the actual manner of utilisation of the preserved policy space and the application not 
only of the Investment Act but of the entirety of the foreign investment related legislation will be 
decisive in order to achieve a reasonable balance between the domestic public interest and policy 
space and foreign investors’ needs of predictable and reliable investment protection. 
It will be necessary for the government to show its dedication and commitment towards the 
establishment of a balanced regime, equally taking into account the respective needs and interests 
whilst preventing arbitrariness and discrimination, in order to maintain South Africa’s status as a 
foreign investment-friendly venue and to convince foreign investors of the continued long-term 
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